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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. The Financial Crisis in the United States and Germany 
The collapse in the market for exotic financial instruments, the 
liquidity crisis in major financial institutions, and the government  
bailouts in 2008 and 2009 illustrate the massive social cost of financial 
risk taking.  In 2007, the market experienced record downgrades in 
mortgage-backed securities, including Collateralized Debt Obliga-
tions (CDOs).  Other complex debt securities fueled unprecedented 
bank write-downs.  “Some AAA rated debt lost all its value.”
1
  January 
2008 was the worst month for CDOs in more than 10 years with is-
suance of CDOs “grinding to a near halt worldwide.”
2
  Experts had 
previously estimated the value of the CDO market at more than $2 
trillion.
3
  As the value of CDOs fell, the market for them disappeared.  
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 1 Jody Shenn, CDO Market Is Almost Frozen, JP Morgan, Merrill Say (Update2), 
BLOOMBERG (Feb. 5, 2008 3:09 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/ 
news?pid=20601087&sid=aCk0Qr1f2Eew&refer=home (“The slowdown of the more 
than $2 trillion CDO market follows record downgrades in mortgage-linked securi-
ties last year.”).  
 2 Paul J. Davies, Trading in CDOs Slows to a Trickle, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 11, 2008), 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/39f3e128-d808-11dc-98f7-
0000779fd2ac.html?nclick_check=1. 
 3 See Yongheng Deng, Stuart A. Gabriel & Anthony B. Sanders, CDO Market Im-
plosion And The Pricing Of Subprime Mortgage-Backed Securities 3 (Inst. of Real Estate 
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These are only a few examples of what went wrong in the United 
States in 2008. 
Financial instability easily spreads from one institution to anoth-
er and then across national boundaries.
4
  The financial crisis of 2008 
quickly spread to Germany, inflicting significant damage there even 
before German banks suffered a second blow from the sovereign debt 
crisis of 2010.  IKB Deutsche Industriebank AG (IKB), Westdeutsche 
Landesbank (WestLB), Bayerische Landesbank (BayernLB), 
and Landesbank Sachsen AG (SachsenLB) cost the German taxpayer 
the most,
5
 but many other German banks had also invested in CDOs 
and other American financial instruments.  The banks made these 
investments through special purpose entities and other conduits in 
foreign jurisdictions that held CDOs and other long-term mortgage 
loans that had been financed with the proceeds of short-term fi-
nanced Asset Backed Commercial Paper (ABCP) and Asset Backed 
Securities (ABSs).
6
  The German banks provided guarantees in the 
form of credit enhancement and liquidity to the conduits,
7
 which 
enabled the conduits to finance the long-term financial instruments 
through the issuance of the short-term financial instruments.
8
  The 
conduits that actually held these investments were located mostly out-
side of the jurisdiction of German banking supervision.
9
  The Ger-
man banks’ own exposure to these investments through the guaran-
 
Studies, Working Paper No. 2009-012, 2009), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID1356630_code17741.pdf?abstra
ctid=1356630&mirid=5.  
 4 Kenneth W. Dam, The Subprime Crisis and Financial Regulation: International and 
Comparative Perspectives, 10 CHI. J. INT’L L. 581, 608 (2009). 
 5 Marcus Lutter, Bankenkrise und Organhaftung, 5 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR 
WIRTSCHAFTRECHT [ZIP] [JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW] 197, 199 (2009). 
 6 Asset Backed Commercial Papers (ABCP) are short-term investment vehicles 
with a short maturity that is typically between 90 and 180 days.  A financial institution 
typically issues the underlying security of the ABCP.  The ABCP notes are backed by 
physical assets such as trade receivables and are generally used for short-term financ-
ing needs.  See generally Swasi Bate, Stephany Bushweller & Everett Rutan, The Funda-
mentals of Asset-Backed Commercial Paper, MOODY’S INVESTOR SERVICE (Feb. 3, 2003), 
http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~igiddy/ABS/moodysabcp.pdf.   
 7 See Lutter, supra note 5. 
 8 Asset Backed Securities (ABS) are financial securities that are backed by a loan, 
lease, or receivables against assets other than real estate and mortgage-backed securi-
ties.  See Timothy J. Riddiough, Optimal Design and Governance of Asset-Backed Securities, 
6 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 2, 121–22 (1997), available at http://research3.bus.wisc.edu 
/file.php/136/Papers/1995-10-12_Optimal_Design_and_Governance_of_Asset-
Backed_Securities_Journal_of_Financial_Intermediation_.pdf. 
 9 Id.; see also Christian Kirchner, Combined Deficits of Corporate Governance and of 
Financial Reporting in the International Financial Markets Crisis, at 5 (unpublished ar-
ticle) (on file with author).  
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tees was often hidden and not included in their accounting.  The in-
herent risk of the guarantees to the banks, however, became appar-
ent when the market for CDOs collapsed.
10
 
One of many examples of such investments was IKB’s involve-
ment in so called Asset Backed Commercial Paper Programs (ABCP-
Programs).
11
  In these programs American Banks sold long-term 
mortgage and subprime loans to special purpose vehicles (SPVs).
12
  In 
the case of IKB, its SPV, Rhineland Funding, transformed these sub-
prime loans into short-term ABSs that were then sold to institutional 
investors.
13
  IKB and other German banks ventured into ABCP-
Programs hoping to profit from refinancing American mortgage 
loans.  For example, a German bank, or more often its SPV, could 
buy a 6% long-term mortgage loan from an American Bank and 
transfer it into 4% ABCP while keeping the spread of 2%.  A signifi-
cant downside of this business model, however, was liquidity and re-
sale risk—profiting through the spread only worked while the con-
duit (i.e. Rhineland Funding) found buyers for the ABCP it issued to 
pay for the American mortgage loans it bought.
14
  The ABCP, unlike 
the mortgage loans, was short term, posing significant liquidity risk if 
new ABCP buyers could not be found to pay off ABCP holders that 
wanted to cash out.
15
  To minimize liquidity and resale risk, and thus 
attract buyers for the ABCP, IKB provided credit enhancements to 
Rhineland Funding.
16
  In 2007, institutional buyers started to realize 
 
 10  Alexandra Krieger, Wie kam es zur Subprime-Krise, und wie gerieten Banken in die 
Schieflage? Ursachen und Schlussfolgerungen für die Praxis am Beispiel der IKB Deutsche 
Industriebank AG, HANS BÖCKLER STIFTUNG, 11–12 (Sept. 2008), 
http://www.boeckler.de/pdf/mbf_finanzinvestoren_ikd.pdf.   
 11 See generally Kirchner, supra note 9; Krieger, supra note 10, at 12–13. 
 12 JASON COX, JUDITH FAUCETTE & CONSUELO VALEZUELA LICKSTEIN, WHY DID THE 
CREDIT CRISIS SPREAD TO GLOBAL MARKETS? pt.B.1.a (Univ. of Iowa Ctr. For Int’l Fin. 
& Dev., March 2010), available at http://www.uiowa.edu/ifdebook/ 
ebook2/contents/part5-II.shtml (explaining how SPVs were used to issue asset 
backed securities into the markets). 
 13 Krieger, supra note 10, at 13. 
 14 Id. at 18.  
 15 A Boom Amid the Bust, ECONOMIST, June 14, 2008, at 1 (“[Money funds] bought 
much of the short-term debt propped up in structured finance.  It was their sudden 
withdrawal that caused the market in asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) to seize 
up.  And banks’ liquidity problems are largely the result of money funds’ recent re-
luctance to hold their debt.”). 
 16 Carrick Mollenkamp, Edward Taylor & Ian McDonald, Global Scale: Impact of 
Mortgage Crisis Spreads—How Subprime Mess Ensnared German Bank: IKB Gets a Bailout, 
WALL ST. J., Aug. 10, 2007, at A1. 
The affiliate IKB set up for bond investing five years ago is Rhineland 
Funding Capital Corp.  The purchases included bonds backed by sub-
prime mortgages, those issued to home buyers with weak credit.  It was 
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the high-risk market environment in which they were operating and 
began to pull out of the ABCP market.
17
  Without buyers for ABCP 
Products, Rhineland Funding was forced to turn to IKB for the 
agreed upon credit enhancement and liquidity.
18
  This eventually 
precipitated the demise of IKB and its bailout by the German Gov-
ernment.
19
  However, IKB was not the only German bank engaged in 
America’s housing market.  At the end of 2006 three German 
banks—Deutsche Bank, IKB, and SachsenLB—were the leading bank 
sponsors with outstanding ABCP.
20
  After accumulating $114 billion 
of toxic assets in the mortgage market that are now of questionable 
value, WestLB had to be bailed out four times.
21
 
Part of the problem was that U.S. financial institutions some-
times were less than candid in their selling efforts directed at German 
banks.  The U.S. Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) accused 
Goldman Sachs of conduct that amounted to fraud in selling CDOs 
to IKB.
22
  In 2007, the Düsseldorf-based bank began talks with Gold-
man to invest in an instrument that would allow IKB to bet that hous-
ing prices would rise.
23
  The SEC complaint alleged that Goldman sys-
tematically defrauded IKB; 
24
 in the SEC’s view, it did not matter that 
IKB was a sophisticated investor because Goldman did not provide 
 
a global circuit: Rhineland partly funded its bond purchases through 
short-term debt issued to U.S. investors, such as a suburban Minneapo-
lis school district and the city of Oakland, Calif.  But Rhineland’s short-
term borrowings had to be renewed frequently.  And when investors 
realized that their collateral for the borrowings included U.S. subprime 
mortgages, they shut off the spigot. 
Id. 
 17 Id. 
 18 Ragnhild Kjetland & Ulrike Dauer, Credit Crunch: Markets’ Ride: Sachsen’s CEO, 
Rest of Board To Depart in Subprime Fallout, WALL ST. J., Aug. 31, 2007, at C2 (“In late 
July [2007], IKB, whose main business is lending to small- and midsize German com-
panies, announced it wouldn’t be able to cover liquidity needs and risks at the in-
vestment vehicle Rhineland Funding.”). 
 19 Krieger, supra note 10, at 35–36. 
 20 Id. at 12.  
 21 IKB, Credit-Crunch Chump, The Bigger Fools, THE ECONOMIST, April 24, 2010, at 
72.  
 22 See Complaint at 20–21, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Goldman Sachs & Co., filed, 
No. 10-CV-3229 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/ 
litigation/complaints/2010/comp-pr2010-59.pdf; Settlement, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 
v. Goldman Sachs & Co., No. 10-CV-3229 (S.D.N.Y July 14, 2010), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2010/judgment-pr2010-123.pdf. 
 23 See Complaint supra note 22, at 15–16. 
 24 See id. at 20–21. 
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the objective investment advice IKB expected to get.
25
  More specifi-
cally, the SEC complaint alleged that: 
The fact that the portfolio had been selected by an independent 
third-party with experience and economic interests aligned with 
CDO investors was important to IKB.  IKB would not have in-
vested in the transaction had it known that Paulson [a hedge fund 
manager who took the other side of the bet] played a significant 
role in the collateral selection process while intending to take a 
short position . . . .
26
 
The German government, which has not yet launched proceedings 
against Goldman Sachs, has indicated that it is examining its relation-
ship with Goldman Sachs although it is not yet prepared to limit its 
dealings with the bank.
27
 
Many observers around the world have concluded that debt 
markets failed to function properly in 2008 because of CDOs and 
other problems.
28
  At least before the sovereign debt crisis of 2010, 
much of the alleged market failure was blamed on risky banking 
practices that originated in the United States.
29
  The experience of 
German banks with CDOs, however, revealed that some of the non-
U.S. victims were willing participants in the risk, even if they did not 
always fully understand the risks.  In fact, the SEC’s position in the 
Goldman complaint is that at least with respect to the transaction at 
issue, IKB did not understand important aspects of the risk.
30
  Banks 
in England, Germany, and elsewhere also at times were facilitators 
and enablers of risky practices in the United States.
31
  A U.K. Bank, 
for example, assisted Lehman Brothers with its efforts to conceal debt 
 
 25 See id. at 15–18.  
 26 See id. at 17.  
 27 See Zachary A. Goldfarb, SEC Confident on IKB Part of Goldman Suit, WASH. POST, 
Apr. 24, 2010, at A7, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/04/23/AR2010042305223.html.  
 28 See Kara Scanell, SEC Steps up Probe of Crisis Deals by Fund, WALL ST. J., June 19, 
2010, at A1 (noting that critics have said the crisis worsened when banks experienced 
great losses due to CDOs they had incurred but could not sell). 
 29 See John Cassidy, Banks Must Pay for Market Failure, TELEGRAPH, Nov. 30, 2009, 
available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/banksandfinance/ 
6689145/Banks-must-pay-for-market-failure. 
 30 See Complaint at 17, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Goldman Sachs & Co., filed, No. 
10-CV-3229 (S.D.N.Y. April 16, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/ 
litigation/complaints/2010/comp-pr2010-59.pdf. 
 31 See Bill Buzenberg, Commentary; The Mega-Banks Behind the Meltdown—How Wall 
Street’s Greed Fueled the Subprime Disaster, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY, May 6, 2009 available 
at http://www.publicintegrity.org/investigations/economic_meltdown/articles/ 
entry/1343 (discussing how the largest American and European banks were not vic-
tims of the financial collapse, but enablers). 
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on its balance sheet through a transaction known as “Repo 105.”
32
  
Market failure and excessively risky banking practices have been wide-
ly recognized as a global problem and not just an American problem. 
B. The Issues Confronting the United States and Germany 
This Article makes some preliminary observations on how two 
countries—the United States and Germany—are likely to deal with 
this problem in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis.  As of the 
publication date for this Article, regulatory and other measures are 
being considered in both countries, and many of these measures have 
yet to be approved or implemented.  Detailed commentary will have 
to wait. 
We should also note at the outset that the concepts of “market 
failure” and “excessive risk” are both controversial.  Whether markets 
fail and why they fail is one issue, and whether there is any such thing 
as excessive risk, and if so, how excessive risk is to be defined, is 
another issue.  Viewpoints on these questions will have a substantial 
impact on how a policy maker—or a group of policy makers in a par-
ticular country—approaches regulation of risk in the banking sector.  
The intent of this Article is not to advance a particular perspective on 
these questions but to illustrate how attitudes toward markets and risk 
in the United States and in Germany will likely affect the response to 
the crisis of 2008. 
Economists have long debated the theory of market failure.
33
  
Paul A. Samuelson defined the phenomenon of market failure and 
 
 32 A Repo 105 is an accounting practice that allows a bank to take massive liabili-
ties off its balance sheet, thus making the bank look significantly healthier than it ac-
tually is.  See Report of Anton R. Valukas at 737, In re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., 
No. 08-13555, (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2010).  To call a repo a true sale based on 
legal technicalities, however, a law firm needs to write a legal opinion.  Id. at 783 
n.3017.  In Lehman’s case the bank was unable to find a U.S. law firm that would 
provide such an opinion letter permitting the true sale accounting treatment.  Id. at 
783.  In order to get the Repo 105 treatment, Lehman had to transfer the securities 
involved to London where the transaction would take place and get a U.K. law firm 
to provide the legal opinion.  Id. at 784.  Here, Linklaters, a magic circle law firm in 
London, wrote the legal opinion for LBIE, Lehman’s European broker-dealer in 
London, under English law.  Id. at 784–86. 
 33 For a thorough discussion of the theory of market failure and most of the ar-
guments pro and contra, see generally DOUGLASS C. NORTH & ROBERT PAUL THOMAS, 
THE RISE OF THE WESTERN WORLD: A NEW ECONOMIC HISTORY (1973); PAUL A. 
SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS: AN INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS (6th ed. 1964); DAVID L. WEIMER 
& AIDAN R. VINING, POLICY ANALYSIS: CONCEPTS AND PRACTICE (2d ed. 1992); Louis De 
Alessi, Error and Bias in Benefit-Cost Analysis: HUD’s Case for the Wind Rule, 16 CATO J. 
129 (1996), available at https://www.cato.org/pubs/journal/cj16n1/cj16n1-8.pdf; 
Steven N. S. Cheung, The Fable of the Bees: An Economic Investigation, 16 J. L. & ECON. 
11 (1973); Ronald H. Coase, The Lighthouse in Economics, 17 J. L. & ECON. 357 (1974); 
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formalized it.
34
  Other economists later opined that Samuelson’s ar-
guments were, in many respects, fallacious.
35
  In some cases markets 
could be inefficient because agreements within the market were not 
enforced.
36
  Some economists in Germany and elsewhere in Europe 
have been more skeptical about efficient markets than many of their 
counterparts in the United States.
37
  Some economists in the United 
States, however, have always been suspicious of market efficiency,
38
 
 
Joseph Farrell, Information and the Coase Theorem, 1 J. ECON. PERSP. 113 (1987); James 
E. Meade, External Economies and Diseconomies in a Competitive Situation, 62 ECON. J. 54 
(1952); Richard R. Nelson, Roles of Government in a Mixed Economy, 6 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS 
AND MGMT. 541 (1987); Charles Wolf, A Theory of Nonmarket Failure: Framework for Im-
plementation Analysis, 22 J. L. & ECON. 107 (1979). 
 34 See SAMUELSON, supra note 33 (outlining basic economic concepts and market 
theory).  
 35 See, e.g., THE THEORY OF MARKET FAILURE: A CRITICAL EXAMINATION (Tyler Co-
wen ed., 1988) (compiling a collection of primary critiques of market-failure theory 
with suggestions on further research, including contributions from James M. Bucha-
nan, Robert J. Smith, Robert Axelrod, Earl R. Brubaker, Steven N. S. Cheung, Harold 
Demsetz, Jerome Ellig, Kenneth D. Goldin, and Jack High). 
 36 See NORTH & THOMAS, supra note 33, at 8 (“Governments take over the protec-
tion and enforcement of property rights because they can do so at lower cost than 
private volunteer groups.”). 
 37 See Alberto Alesina & George-Marios Angeletos, Fairness and Redistribution, 95 
AM. ECON. REV. 960, 974 (2005) (noting that Europeans favor forms of government 
intervention, whereas in the U.S., Americans favor limited regulation, which results 
in more efficient market outcomes); Torben G. Anderson & Tim Bollerslev, Deutsche 
Mark-Dollar Volatility: Intraday Activity Patterns, Macroeconomic Announcements, and Long-
er Run Dependencies, 53 J. FIN. 219, 219–21 (1998) (discussing that while the efficient 
market hypothesis asserts that price changes reflect the availability of new, relevant 
information, in Germany, the availability of such information does not explain over-
all volatility and what drives the German markets); Michael Melvin & Bettina Peiers 
Melvin, The Global Transmission of Volatility in the Foreign Exchange Market, 85 REV. 
ECON. & STAT. 670, 679 (2003) (noting the possibility of arguing that the persistent 
volatility in foreign exchange markets does not support the efficient market theory); 
Kurt Richebacher, The Problems and Prospects of Integrating European Capital Markets, 1 J. 
MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 336, 338 (1969) (proposing that because the U.S. has a 
centralized market in New York, the market is highly efficient, but because Europe’s 
market is decentralized, an efficient market solution for Europe “belongs in a uto-
pian world”); Leland B. Yeager, Austrian Economics, Neoclassicism, and the Market Test, 
11 J. ECON. PERSP. 153, 154 (1997) (asserting that Austrians consider the market sys-
tem a complex arrangement that cannot be explained by an economic model but 
rather by analyzing the organization of the economy from individuals to agencies); 
Amir Amel-Zadeh, The Return of the Size Anomaly: Evidence from the German Stock Market 
36 (Univ. of Cambridge, Judge Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 23/2006, 2008), availa-
ble at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=952472 (“Our findings 
that firm-specific characteristics are able to explain some variation of stock returns 
adds to the growing literature at odds with the efficient markets hypothesis and leads 
us to seek salvation in behavioural [sic] explanation.”). 
 38 See generally ROBERT A. HAUGEN, THE NEW FINANCE: THE CASE AGAINST EFFICIENT 
MARKETS (1995) (arguing that the efficient market theory is unrealistic and present-
ing evidence supporting inefficient markets); ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL 
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and others are now pointing to the events of 2008 as an illustration of 
how markets can and do fail. Regardless of which perspective is cor-
rect, perspectives on market failure can affect both bankers’ business 
practices and the policies of bank regulators.  Bankers who believe 
that markets fail may be more cautious when investing in markets, 
and regulators who believe that markets fail may be more aggressive 
when regulating markets.  Different perspectives on markets and 
their efficiency—or inefficiency—could be an important explanation 
for different responses in the United States and Germany to the 
events of 2008. 
The credit crisis of 2008–2009 also convinced many observers 
that the level of risk in the financial sector was excessive.
39
  In general, 
it is difficult to escape the conclusion that there was an enormous 
amount of risk taking in financial markets in the years leading up to 
2008.  Some investors—usually agents investing other people’s mon-
ey—traded in volatile financial instruments they only partially un-
derstood.
40
  Observers blamed risky investments for the downfall of 
major financial institutions, destruction of markets for financial in-
struments, and widespread economic chaos.  The more hotly debated 
question, however, is whether bankers assumed too much risk in par-
ticular transactions and if so, how to define how much risk is too 
much.  Which particular decisions by bankers were excessively risky, 
which were not, and how can one distinguish between the two? 
Risk is not inherently bad, and indeed, the economy thrives on 
some types of risk.  Risk aversion can lead to suboptimal allocation of 
resources
41
 and detriments to shareholders who demand high returns 
on capital.
42
  Achieving an appropriate balance between risks that are 
 
EXUBERANCE (2d ed. 2005) (discussing the obsession with stock markets and its effect 
on the market).  
 39 James E. Kelly, Transparency and Bank Supervision, 73 ALB. L. REV. 421, 421 (re-
cognizing that in light of the recent crisis, critics’ concerns have focused on the role 
of systemic risk in financial institutions and markets). 
 40 See generally Wulf A. Kaal, Hedge Fund Valuation: Retailization, Regulation, and In-
vestor Suitability, 28 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 581 (2009), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1428387 (arguing that the lack 
of understanding of certain financial instruments and the hierarchies in financial 
institutions exacerbated the principal agent problem and contributed to the demise 
of markets in financial instruments).  
 41 Markus Ruffner, Sorgfalts- und Treuepflichten und die Versicherbarkeit von 
Haftungsrisiken in Publikumsgesellschaften – eine ökonomische Analyse, 119 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR 
SCHWEIZERISCHES RECHT [ZSR] [JOURNAL OF SWISS LAW] 195, 213 (2000) (Ger.). 
 42 See, e.g., Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int’l, 683 A.2d 1049, 1052 (Del. Ch. 1996) 
(“Shareholders do not want (or should not rationally want) directors to be risk 
averse.  Shareholders’ investment interest, across the full range of their diversifiable 
equity investments, will be maximized if corporate directors and managers honestly 
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informed and reasonable on the one hand and risks that are unrea-
sonable or uninformed on the other is a challenge in managing a 
business enterprise, particularly a financial institution.  To the extent 
regulators and courts are charged with monitoring financial risk in 
private enterprise, achieving a balanced legal approach to risk is also 
a challenge. 
Corporate directors are charged with numerous tasks, and the 
emphasis in the United States, and increasingly in other countries is 
on maximizing shareholder wealth.
43
  In order to do their jobs, man-
agers often must take reasonable risks while avoiding excessive risk.
44
  
Distinguishing the two is a subject of much debate, a debate which 
will intensify in light of recent events.  Part of this debate is over how 
much of a role the law—as opposed to shareholders, markets, or oth-
er mechanisms—should have in defining the difference between risk 
that it reasonable and that which is not.  If the law does intervene, a 
second debate is over how the law should intervene—government 
regulation of risk taking, mandatory disclosure rules that make 
shareholders and other investors aware of risks, shareholder suits, or 
other approaches. 
Perspectives on the question of how much risk is too much risk 
and the related question of how to regulate it are likely to shape the 
attitudes of both bankers and policy makers.  As discussed further in 
this Article, perspectives on risk are different in the United States and 
in Germany.  The objective of this Article is not to discuss which 
perspective on risk is the correct one but instead to point out that 
perspectives on risk differ and that these differences are likely to af-
fect both banking practices and regulation in the United States and 
Germany. 
 
assess risk and reward and accept for the corporation the highest risk adjusted re-
turns available that are above the firm’s cost of capital.”). 
 43 See Dodge v. Ford Motors Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (“A business 
corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders.  
The power of the directors are to be employed for that end.”); Henry Hansmann & 
Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 439 (2001) 
(“There is no longer any serious competitor to the view that corporate law should 
principally strive to increase long-term shareholder value.”); Mark J. Roe, The Share-
holder Wealth Maximization Norm and Industrial Organization, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2063, 
2065 (2001) (“[S]hareholder wealth maximization is usually accepted as the appro-
priate goal in American business circles.”). 
 44 For a discussion on corporate responsibility and shareholder wealth maximiza-
tion, see STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 419–29 (2002).  
See also FRANK E. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW 104 (1991).  
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In both the United States and Germany the response to risk has 
included, and will likely include yet more, legal constraints on risk.  
Neither country relies exclusively on cultural and business risk avoid-
ance norms.  As explained more fully below, reliance on risk avoid-
ance norms of private actors may be more prevalent in Germany than 
in the United States, but recent events have led both countries to be 
suspicious of unregulated financial risk.  Generally, the legal con-
straint comes in two parts: rules that restrict risk taking itself and dis-
closure rules. 
Rules that restrict risk taking often focus on particular types of 
risk—such rules include, for example, regulation of the investments 
made by banks and capital requirements for banks.  Proposals to re-
quire banks to separate certain trading operations, such as derivatives 
from their regular banking operations, are an example of rules de-
signed to limit risk taking in specific areas.  Because of recent events, 
more such rules will likely emerge in both the United States and 
Germany in the near future. 
Outside the scope of these rules that constrain specific types of 
risk, the law can also incorporate a more general principle barring 
managers from incurring risk that exceeds a certain standard.  The 
law does not do so in most instances because defining such a stan-
dard is difficult.  Corporate law instead protects the risk decisions of 
bank managers from challenge through a concept known as the 
“business judgment rule.”  The business judgment rule in both the 
United States and Germany precludes judicial review of most deci-
sions by corporate directors and protects directors from potential lia-
bility for “good faith” decisions, even if those decisions ultimately end 
in failure.
45
  The rule creates a rebuttable presumption that directors, 
while independent and disinterested, acted on an informed basis, 
with a proper business purpose, and in the best interest of the corpo-
ration.
46
  Courts and legal commentators in the United States and 
Germany have long emphasized the importance of the rule in pro-
moting the kind of risk taking by corporations that results in new 
ideas, new technologies, and new markets.  As explained more fully 
below, the business judgment rule is articulated differently in the 
United States and in Germany, and there may be more latitude to 
challenge some risky decisions in Germany, but in both countries the 
rule is highly protective of corporate managers.  Arguably, the busi-
 
 45 See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkum, 488 A.2d 858, 872–73 (Del. 1985); Aktiengesetz 
[AktG] [German Stock Corporation Act], Sept. 6, 1965, BGBL. I at 1089, § 93(1)–(2) 
(Ger.). 
 46 See id.  
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ness judgment rule finds a middle ground between excessive risk and 
excessive risk aversion while taking into account the interests of 
shareholders, corporate directors, and sometimes other constituen-
cies.  Alternatively, one could view the business judgment rule as be-
ing too deferential to management, and an indication that corporate 
law is abandoning the field of risk regulation to more specific rules 
aimed at specific types of risk in specific types of institutions. 
The United States and German governments, as most other in-
dustrialized countries, enacted mandatory disclosure laws to facilitate 
the flow of information about risks to investors.  Registration state-
ments in the United States, for example, have a separate section titled 
“risk factors.”
47
  These laws do not seek to regulate risk taking, or even 
to impose due care or other obligations on the risk takers, other than 
the duty of disclosure.  Policy makers and commentators in the Unit-
ed States and Germany debate how much disclosure should be re-
quired and what the consequences—government sanctions, civil liti-
gation, or both—should be for failure to disclose.  Historically, 
disclosure obligations have been more robust in the United States 
than in Germany, but Germany along with the rest of the E.U. is mov-
ing toward more disclosure.  Furthermore, disclosure rules in the 
United States, however robust, are sometimes ignored. 
Finally, commentators on German and American approaches to 
risk inevitably confront one of the most often debated issues in com-
parative law: whether there is convergence or divergence in legal 
rules.  In a global economy dominated by corporations as well as un-
incorporated entities,
48
 to what extent is the relevant law converging 
or diverging in the world’s largest economies?
49
  Changes in the in-
terpretation of the business judgment rule as well as legislative pro-
posals pertaining to risk taking by managers in Germany and the 
United States may illustrate a trend towards divergence in legal ap-
 
 47 17 C.F.R. § 230.421(b) (2009). 
 48 See, e.g., LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE RISE OF THE UNCORPORATION 2 (2010).  See gen-
erally Larry E. Ribstein, Uncorporating the Large Firm (Ill. Law and Econ. Research Pa-
per Series, Research Paper No. LE08-016, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?absact_id=1003790 (discussing the increase in the use of uncorporations, 
such as LLCs and limited partnerships, where large corporate firms previously domi-
nated the corporate landscape). 
 49 See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future as History: The Prospects for Global Conver-
gence in Corporate Governance and Its Implications (Colum. Law Sch. Ctr. for Law and 
Econ. Studies, Working Paper No. 144, 1999), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=142833.  
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proaches.
50
  At the time of this writing, it is unclear how much diver-
gence there will be between these two countries, and whether there 
will be a later shift toward convergence when countries try to coordi-
nate their rules on risk. 
A closely related issue is whether there is a convergence or di-
vergence in business practices.  Will bankers respond to the events of 
2008 differently in Germany than in the United States even in the ab-
sence of regulation?  Will one or both countries experience more vo-
luntary risk aversion on the part of bankers who have supposedly 
learned their lesson? 
German banks of course have also been affected by the sove-
reign debt crisis of 2010, which was triggered by rising government 
debt together with downgrading of government debt in Europe.  The 
countries of most concern were Greece, Italy, Spain, and Portugal. 
European countries and the International Monetary Fund agreed to 
a €110 billion ($146 billion) loan to Greece conditioned on harsh 
austerity measures.
51
  The ensuing crisis triggered a widening of bond 
yield spreads and higher rates for risk insurance on credit default 
swaps between the most adversely affected countries and other EU 
member states.
52
  The apparent inability of German bank managers to 
anticipate the implications of such a crisis until it was too late remains 
a great concern. 
 While we recognize the importance of the sovereign debt crisis 
and its implications for Germany, this Article will not address the im-
plications of that crisis but will instead focus on the credit crisis of 
2008–2009 and its effects on approaches to risk taking in Germany 
and the United States.  The overall German approach to risk taking, 
however, may be affected by the fact that German banks, like Ameri-
can banks, have been exposed to the 2008 credit crisis, and unlike 
their American rivals, German banks also face a second threat in their 
exposure to the 2010 sovereign debt crisis.  This combination of fac-
tors could lead the German regulators and bankers themselves to im-
pose stricter substantive rules for risk management in comparison 
 
 50 The authors do not intend to imply that there is a general trend toward diver-
gence in corporate law.  The Article merely analyzes trends in the approaches to risk 
taking.   
 51 Kerin Hope, Nikki Tait & Quentin Peel, Eurozone Agrees €110bn Greece Loans, 
FIN. TIMES (May 2, 2010), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a3307762-5616-11df-b835-
00144feab49a.html. 
 52 David Oakley & Kerin Hope, Gilt Yields Climb on UK Debt Concerns, FIN. TIMES 
(Feb. 18, 2010), at 21, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/7d25573c-1ccc-11df-
8d8e-00144feab49a.html.  
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stringent duty to monitor on board members will likely increase, but 
it is not clear how much and how fast this cost will increase.  The 
three upward sloping solid lines illustrate some potential cost 
changes.  Costs could increase very quickly and then level off at a lat-
er point, or costs could instead increase more slowly and gradually.  
At the same time, the cost of bad (e.g. excessively risky) business deci-
sions that could have been avoided by monitoring decreases.  We in-
clude alternative Lines 2a, 2b, and 2c because as discussed below, 
from a cost perspective the way in which the monitoring requirement be-
comes more stringent matters.  The mix between agency enforcement 
and civil litigation matters; the mix between changes to substantive 
and procedural rules matters; and the particular changes to rules also 
matter.  One particular combination of measures may create a sharp-
ly sloping line (Line 2b), whereas another may result in the more 
gently sloping line in which costs rise slowly (Line 2c).  The cultural 
context also matters; a particular combination of substantive and 
procedural rules in one setting—for example, the U.S.—may result in 
a sharply rising solid line whereas the same combination in another 
setting—for example, Germany—may result in more gently rising 
costs, or vice versa.  These differences are likely part of the explana-
tion for why different countries have different approaches to direc-
tors’ duty to monitor for risk as well as other ways of constraining risk; 
imposing a duty to monitor, or simply prohibiting certain types of de-
rivative securities, for example, could be more costly for financial in-
stitutions in one country than in another. 
The dashed downward sloping line (Line 1) shows the effect 
of a more stringent monitoring requirement on mitigating costs di-
rectly attributable to excessive risk taking.  These costs should decline 
as the monitoring requirement becomes more severe.  We only in-
clude one dashed line.
54
  Conversely, the costs of bad business deci-
sions rise when the severity of the monitoring requirement decreases 
because substantive standards of care are loosened and/or procedur-
al rules become more favorable for directors accused of violating the 
standard.  Less stringent procedural rules include less vigorous agen-
cy enforcement, higher burdens of proof to show a violation, and less 
private civil litigation.  With a less stringent monitoring requirement, 
the cost of imposing a duty to monitor on directors also may decrease 
as shown by the left portion of Lines 2a, 2b, or 2c.  The cost of bad 
 
 54 This is an oversimplification because a given level of risk deterrence may still 
have a different impact on the company’s costs from excessively risky decisions de-
pending upon what specific types of risks are avoided; some risks are more costly to a 
company than others. 
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business decisions that could have been avoided by monitoring, how-
ever, increases as shown in Line 1.
55
 
Presumably, the total costs involved would be a combination 
of upward sloping (solid) and downward sloping (dashed) lines.  
Given the multitude of unknown parameters, we dispense with show-
ing a total cost line.  Our objective is not to identify a formula for cal-
culating the ideal level of severity for a monitoring requirement or an 
ideal level of deterrence of risk.  Instead, our point is that different 
combinations of substantive rules and procedural rules and practices 
affect both types of costs (costs of monitoring and the cost of bad 
business decisions) differently.  As discussed more fully below, an im-
portant factor is where—the United States, Germany, or somewhere 
else—a particular combination of substantive rules and procedures is 
implemented and how they are implemented.  Different countries 
make different choices about whether and how to impose a duty to 
monitor risk and to what extent.  They make these decisions within 
different institutional frameworks, and sometimes there are good 
reasons for these decisions. 
III. CULTURAL COMPONENTS OF RISK TAKING AND CONTROLLING RISK 
Risk taking can be intentional or unintentional.  Examples of 
intentional and sometimes ill-informed risk taking include invest-
ments in risky real estate deals in the 1980s and the purchase of some 
CDOs and other mortgage-backed securities by investment banks and 
institutional investors prior to the 2008 credit crisis.  Examples of un-
intentional risk taking include miscalculations in valuation models or 
algorithmic trading.  While unintentional risk taking can impose ad-
ditional costs on the institutions that incur it because of the added 
element of surprise, both intentional and unintentional risk taking 
can be costly, and sometimes more costly than the benefits derived 
there from. 
Countries where bankers do not typically embrace intentional 
risk taking are still vulnerable to collateral effects of intentional risk 
taking in other countries as well as unintentional risk taking in their 
own financial institutions.  Regulation and business practices in-
tended to control risk in such countries may be designed principally 
to address these problems, including, for example, rules that limit 
multinational banks’ activities and rules that limit certain types of 
trading. Arguably, Germany is one such country; although, as illu-
 
 55 Although we show only one dashed Line 1, we recognize that the dashed line 
may slope upward to the left in varying ways depending on the types of risks that are 
incurred more often because of less stringent monitoring requirements. 
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strated by the active participation of German banks in CDOs, a lot of 
intentional risk taking has recently taken place in Germany, and the 
German response to the 2008 crisis will likely address this problem.  
Countries where bankers typically embrace intentional risk taking 
may focus management reform and regulation on curtailing incen-
tives for risk taking, such as compensation arrangements that encour-
age bankers to take too much risk.  The United States falls into this 
category. 
Discerning excessive risk from other risk is highly subjective 
and an analysis likely to be undertaken differently in different cultur-
al contexts.  In most cultural settings, risk taking is not viewed as ex-
cessive simply because the risk did not pan out and somebody lost 
money.  Hindsight bias
56
 nonetheless can have a powerful influence 
on the definition of excessive risk.  Hindsight bias and other concep-
tual approaches rooted in past experience—including valid lessons 
learned from past experience—may exert a more powerful influence 
in a country that is otherwise predisposed to be concerned with its 
past and not repeating the mistakes of its past.  On the other hand, in 
a country that is not so concerned with the past and predisposed to 
view the future as being different from the past, experience may exert 
less influence over conceptions of risk.  In such a country, the lessons 
of the past—whether the financial turmoil of the 1930s or more re-
cent experiences—may be more easily forgotten or dismissed as irre-
levant.  Future observers are more likely to view the events of 2008 as 
unique rather than a modern rendition of what happened in finan-
cial bubbles from an earlier era.  A different perspective on the past is 
 
 56 In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 124 (Del. Ch. 
2009) (stating that Delaware courts have developed doctrines such as the business 
judgment rule because of  “the inadequacy of the [c]ourt, due in part to a concept 
known as hindsight bias, to properly evaluate whether corporate decision-makers 
made a ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ decision”) 
When one looks past the lofty allegations of duties of oversight and red 
flags used to dress up these claims, what is left appears to be plaintiff 
shareholders attempting to hold the director defendants personally li-
able for making (or allowing to be made) business decisions that, in 
hindsight, turned out poorly for the company. 
Id.; see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, Caremark and Enterprise Risk Management, 34 J. 
CORP. L. 967, 989 (2009); Paul E. McGreal, Corporate Compliance Survey, 65 BUS. LAW. 
193, 210 (2009) (citing In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d at 
124) (summarizing legal developments in corporate compliance in 2009 and noting 
that Delaware Courts have developed doctrines to “properly focus on the decision-
making process rather than on a substantive evaluation of the merits of the decision . 
. . due in part to a concept known as hindsight bias”); Jeffrey J. Rachlinksi, A Positive 
Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 571, 621 (1998) (“The 
business judgment rule arises from the concern that even a good decision can pro-
duce an undesirable result and can be judged unfairly in hindsight.”). 
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one of many respects in which the United States and Germany may 
be different. 
The predominant unit of analysis for defining excessive risk—
the individual risk bearer or society as a whole—can be different in 
different cultural contexts.  One approach to defining excessive risk 
that is prevalent in United States jurisprudence is the “prudent per-
son” standard, which focuses on the individual: risk is excessive if a 
reasonably prudent person would not incur that risk in the manage-
ment of his or her own portfolio.
57
  In keeping with this approach, 
one of the authors of this Article has suggested that excessive risk 
could be controlled by making sure that investment bankers are in 
fact managing their own portfolios.
58
   
Another approach is to define excessive risk not by looking to 
the individual but by examining externalized social cost of risk.
59
  Ro-
nald H. Coase described social cost as “those actions of business firms 
which have harmful effects on others.”
60
  Here, social cost can be nar-
 
 57 See Stamp v. Touche Ross & Co., 636 N.E.2d 616, 620 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (“In 
addition to their fiduciary duty to the corporation, corporate directors must exercise 
. . . the degree of care which prudent men . . . would exercise in the management of 
their own affairs.”).  In establishing a prudent person standard,  
[S]ome courts take the view that it is a degree of care which prudent 
persons, prompted by self-interest, would exercise in the management 
of their own affairs.  Other courts . . . stat[e] that the care which a di-
rector of a corporation is bound to exercise in the performance of the 
director’s position is such care as a prudent person should exercise in 
like circumstances. 
18B AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 1467 (2010); see also MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 
2-405.1(a) (West 2010) (codifying the broader prudent person standard). 
A director shall perform his duties as a director, including his duties as 
a member of a committee of the board on which he serves:  
(1) In good faith;  
(2) In a manner he reasonably believes to be in the best inter-
ests of the corporation; and  
(3) With the care that an ordinarily prudent person in a like po-
sition would use under similar circumstances. 
Id. 
 58 See Claire A. Hill & Richard W. Painter, Berle’s Vision Beyond Shareholder Interests: 
Why Investment Bankers Should Have (Some) Personal Liability, 33 U. SEATTLE L. REV. 
(2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1510443.   
 59 See Nina A. Mendelson, A Control-Based Approach to Shareholder Liability for Corpo-
rate Torts, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1203, 1239 (2002) (“Since we lack the ‘control set’ of 
an industrialized regime without limited liability, the extent of the overinvestment in 
this type of excessively risky activity remains an empirical question that is difficult to 
answer precisely.”); see also EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 44, at 50 (“Externali-
zation of risk imposes social costs and thus is undesirable.”).  
 60 Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 1 (1960).  “In de-
vising and choosing between social arrangements we should have regard for the total 
effect.”  Id. at 44.  
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rowly defined by looking to identifiable individuals who are affected 
by excessive risk taking and asking if they are in a position to protect 
themselves.  Excessive risk as externalized social cost would comprise 
any economic transaction involving a significant likelihood of a sub-
stantial economic loss being imposed on a party who is not directly 
involved in the transaction (we will leave aside for the moment what 
exactly is a “significant likelihood” or a “substantial economic loss” 
and how these two factors might relate to each other).  A broader de-
finition of social cost looks to the overall impact on a society of losses 
incurred by multiple parties because of risk, including the impact on 
society from fear of further losses, political destabilization, ethnic and 
national prejudices that might be engendered by financial losses and 
other adverse effects on the social fabric.  If Germany is more con-
cerned about these broader questions than the United States, Ger-
many may prioritize the social unit of analysis over the individual unit 
of analysis and as a result define excessive risk differently. 
Yet another factor influencing attitudes toward incurring risk 
as well as regulating risk is differing attitudes toward personal respon-
sibility.  To what extent should individual bankers be seen as perso-
nally accountable for the losses they inflict on others?  A related ques-
tion is personal liability.  Should individual bankers be liable and if 
so, when?  One explanation for excessive risk taking could be that 
bankers are incentivized to make excessively risky investment deci-
sions if they are protected by limited liability.  Limited liability argua-
bly increases the probability that a corporation may not have suffi-
cient assets to pay its creditors.
61
  Accordingly, both managers and 
shareholders of a corporation enjoy most of the benefits of excessive 
risk taking but do not bear all of the costs.
62
 Arguably, incentives 
should be realigned by assigning liability to corporate directors or the 
highest-ranking corporate officers
63
 or the controlling shareholders.
64
  
Solutions that impose personal liability, however, run the risk of de-
 
 61 See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 44, at 49–50.  
 62 See id. at 50–52. 
 63 See Timothy P. Glynn, Beyond “Unlimiting” Shareholder Liability: Vicarious Tort Lia-
bility for Corporate Officers, 57 VAND. L. REV. 329, 433 (2004); Hill & Painter, supra note 
58 (proposing that the most highly paid investment bankers have strict liability for 
some firm debts as they did in the days of general partnerships). 
 64 Mendelson, supra note 59, at 1203 (noting that controlling shareholders would 
be first and foremost suitable for personal liability as they have “lower information 
costs, greater influence over managerial decisionmaking [sic], and greater ability to 
benefit from corporate activity”).  
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terring reasonable and non-excessive risk taking.
65
  The purpose of 
this Article is not to debate the merits of these different approaches 
but to point out that societies that emphasize personal responsibility 
may be more likely to hold individual bankers legally liable for their 
mistakes than those that do not.  Societies that emphasize personal 
responsibility are also more likely to view corporate officers and di-
rectors as being an appropriate focus of regulation and, in appropri-
ate circumstances, legal liability.  Societies that deemphasize personal 
responsibility are more likely to focus principally on regulating the 
banks and other financial institutions than the individual bankers.  As 
of this writing, there appears to be some acknowledgment of personal 
responsibility of bankers for excessive risk in both the United States 
and Germany with some concrete proposals directed at individual 
bankers at least in Germany.  So far, however, both countries have fo-
cused primarily on the institutions rather than the individuals. 
Appetite for risk also has a cultural dimension.  Different cul-
tures perceive risk taking differently.  For instance, the business cul-
ture in the United States has traditionally been associated with a 
more entrepreneurial spirit, which is linked with an increased wil-
lingness to take risks in order to attain a higher return.  New compa-
nies, including new financial services firms, also rise to the top rela-
tively quickly in the United States, and some old names, such as 
Salomon Brothers, Lehman Brothers, and Bear Stearns, precipitously 
fall.  Long-term relationships between banks and their corporate cus-
tomers used to be important in the United States but these relation-
ships have become less important in an increasingly competitive and 
more fluid market for banking services.  The German culture, on the 
other hand, has been associated with an emphasis on control of fi-
nancial institutions by larger financial institutions.  Longstanding 
banking relationships also are still very important in Germany.  For 
instance, German companies have traditionally had a very strong rela-
tionship with their banking institution, the so-called Hausbank—a re-
lationship in which the bank furnishes capital required to run a busi-
ness and watches the business closely to make sure the capital is used 
 
 65 Kenneth J. Arrow, The Economics of Agency, in PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE 
STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 37, 45 (John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser eds., 1985) 
(finding that personal liability may be a deterrent, assuming that “all individuals are 
averse to sufficiently large risks [and] the risks are large compared with the [individ-
ual’s] wealth.”).  See also EIRIK G. FURUBOTN & RUDOLF RICHTER, INSTITUTIONS AND 
ECONOMIC THEORY: THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 189–
203 (1998).  
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well.  Since the days of the hyperinflation in Germany in the 1920s,
66
 
German bankers also have had a dislike for risk and for the economic 
and political consequences that ensue from instability in financial 
markets.  Bankers who incur excessive risk and inflict excessive risk 
on others probably are not as well liked in Germany as they are in the 
United States, although the younger generation of German bankers 
may be more similar to their American counterparts.  Some of the 
American risk-taking culture memorialized in Michael Lewis’s 1989 
book about Salomon Brothers, Liar’s Poker,67  spread to Germany by 
the 1990s.  Still, the risk-preferring culture was not as deeply embed-
ded in Germany as it was in the United States or even the United 
Kingdom.  After the disastrous developments of 2008 and 2010, Ger-
many may return to its historical aversion to financial risk. 
Incentive structures are yet another relevant factor that may 
encourage risk taking by banks’ officers and directors.  For instance, 
the United States has developed a corporate governance structure 
that emphasizes periodic disclosure of performance data and max-
imization of stock price.
68
  Risk taking in this context may be encour-
aged by the perceived need to satisfy expectations of shareholders.  
Managers feel compelled to fulfill performance expectations whenev-
er results are disclosed, be it quarterly, bi-annually, or annually.  The 
German business culture has traditionally not emphasized disclosure 
and stock price as much as growth in the size and prestige of a bank-
ing corporation, its sustainability, and long-term client relationships.  
Risk taking still occurs in this context, but it may be driven not so 
much by meeting disclosure expectations and generating compensa-
tion related performance data and more by a desire to increase the 
size and power of the corporation and its position in the global mar-
ket place, particularly Europe.
69
  For German bankers, growth in size 
and prestige of their banks may bestow the most substantial boost to 
the managers’ standing in business and social circles as well as per-
haps their compensation. 
Corporate law itself is also a factor in how risk is monitored 
and controlled.  Corporate law in the United States focuses on regu-
lation of conflicts of interest between shareholders and managers.  
 
 66 In November 1923, the interest rate for call money on the Berlin Stock Ex-
change was 30% per day at times.  SIDNEY HOMER, A HISTORY OF INTEREST RATES 465 
(1960). 
 67 MICHAEL LEWIS, LIAR’S POKER (1989).  
 68 See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78a (2006).  
 69 This might explain why German banks have suffered immense losses from 
their efforts to build relationships with EU sovereign debt issuers such as Greece. 
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German corporate law, for historical reasons,
70
 emphasizes the regula-
tion of conflicts between controlling and minority shareholders.  Ar-
guably, a legal system that focuses on the interaction of controlling 
and minority shareholders is not as well equipped to deal with mana-
gerial abuse of power, including excessive risk taking by managers.  
On the other hand, U.S. corporate law centers so much on conflicts 
of interest between shareholders and managers that managers are 
given enormous latitude to exercise unfettered business judgment 
when there is no demonstrable conflict of interest.  Risk taking is one 
of those situations where U.S. corporate law assumes that managers’ 
and shareholders’ interests are aligned, or at least not sufficiently di-
vergent that legal intervention is justified.  Thus, perhaps for differ-
ent reasons, corporate law in both countries may have little to say 
about the problem of excessive risk. 
Governance mechanisms are also different.  U.S. corporations 
are subjected to the supervision of a single board of directors.  The 
German Aktiengesellschaft, or stock corporation, on the other hand, 
has a two-tier governance structure.  The first tier of supervision is the 
Vorstand, or management board, comprised of persons who work 
full-time for the company and are usually its most senior officers.  
The second tier is the Aufsichtsrat, or supervisory board.  In theory, 
the rights and duties of the Vorstand and the Aufsichtsrat are strictly 
separated.  The German Aktiengesetz, or Corporation Act, allows the 
supervisory board to supervise the management board,
71
 i.e. to over-
see the management of the corporation and to co-approve all impor-
tant transactions,
72
 represent the Aktiengesellschaft in dealing with 
the management board,
73
 request reports on recent business activity 
or planned initiatives,
74
 and inspect the books and records annually.  
The Aufsichtsrat also appoints the members of the Vorstand, who are 
officers of the corporation, and can remove them from office.
75
  The 
 
 70 Historically, German corporations evolved in an environment of control—a 
controlling majority shareholder or a multitude of large shareholders—through in-
dividual families.  The Piech family of BMW is still a good example.  For more infor-
mation on voting power concentration in Germany, see Marco Brecht & Ekkehart 
Böhmer, Ownership and Power in Germany, in CONTROL OF CORPORATE EUROPE 128 
(Fabrizio Barca & Marco Becht eds., 2001).  
 71 Aktiengesetz [AktG] [German Stock Corporation Act], Sept. 6, 1965, BGBL. I 
at 1089, § 111(1) (Ger.).  
 72 The articles of association for each Aufsichtsrat further specify these functions. 
 73 AktG § 112.  
 74 AktG § 90(1).  
 75 Removing officers and board members before their term expires—the custo-
mary term being five years—requires cause, such as a material breach, incapacity, or 
a vote of no-confidence at the shareholder’s meeting.  
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primary oversight function of the Aufsichtsrat is to limit self-dealing 
by managers and controlling shareholders.  Secondly, through the 
appointment of Vorstand members, continuous evaluation of their 
performance, and the occasional removal of inefficient or underper-
forming members, the Aufsichtsrat monitors the performance of the 
Vorstand. 
Under various codetermination acts,
76
 the supervisory board is 
not entirely composed of the shareholders’ representatives.  Depend-
ing on the total number of employees of the corporation, the law may 
require the representation of members of the workforce on the su-
pervisory board.  In German corporations with more than two thou-
sand employees, the shareholders appoint half of the Aufsichtsrat 
and the employees appoint the other half.  In corporations with be-
tween 500 and 2,000 employees, the corporation’s employees appoint 
one-third of the Aufsichtsrat.  Although the chairman of the Aufsich-
tsrat has additional voting rights that can sway the Aufsichtsrat in fa-
vor of the representatives of the majority shareholders,
77
 a co-
determined Aufsichtsrat can make the decision-making process more 
cumbersome.  Employee representatives may also feel that they 
represent the political objectives of unions as well as the interests of 
the company.  It may be difficult for a co-determined Aufsichtsrat to 
respond quickly to rapidly changing developments, such as an escala-
tion of financial risk in a securities portfolio or a liquidity crisis. 
The impact of codetermination on corporate governance in 
Germany and on the market returns of German corporations is un-
clear.
78
  The impact on risk is also unclear.  It is possible that the Auf-
 
 76 See, e.g., Gesetz über die Mitbestimmung der Arbeitnehmer in den Auf-
sichträten und Vorständen der Unternemen des Bergbaus und der Eisen und Stahl 
erzeugenden Industrie [MontanMitbestG], May 1951, BGBL I at 347 (Ger); Gesetz 
über die Mitbestimmung der Arbeitnehmer [Mitbestimmungsgesetz—MitbestG], 
May 4, 1976, BGBL II at 1153, § 9 (Ger.).  
 77 The chairman can make the tie-breaking vote.  See Theodor Baums & Bernd 
Frick, The Market Value of the Codetermined Firm, in EMPLOYEES AND CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 206, 209 (Margaret M. Blair & Mark J. Roe eds., 1999). 
 78 See Martin Henssler, Arbeitnehmermitbestimmung im deutschen Gesellschaftsrecht, in 
UNTERNEHMENS-MITBESTIMMUNG DER ARBEITNEHMER IM RECHT DER EU-
MITGLIEDSTAATEN [EMPLOYEES’ CO-DETERMINATION IN THE MEMBER STATES OF THE 
EUROPEAN UNION] 133, 147–48 (Theodor Baums & Peter Ulmer eds., 2004) (Ger.); 
Thomas Raiser, Bewährung des Mitbestimmungsgesetzes nach zwanzig Jahren?, in 
WIRTSCHAFTS- UND MEDIENRECHT IN DER OFFENEN DEMOKRATIE. FREUNDESGABE FÜR 
FRIEDRICH KÜBLER ZUM 65. GEBURTSTAG 477, 491–92 (Heinz-Dieter Assmann et al. 
eds., 1997) (Ger.); Rüdiger von Rosen, Kapitalmarkt und Mitbestimmung, in 
UNTERNEHMENSRECHT ZU BEGINN DES 21. JAHRHUNDERTS: FESTSCHRIFT FÜR EBERHARD 
SCHWARK 789, 793–94 (Stefan Grundmann et al. eds., 2009) (Ger.); Dieter Sadowski, 
Joachim Junkes & Sabine Lindenthal, Gesetzliche Mitbestimmung in Deutschland: Idee, 
Erfahrungen und Perspektiven aus ökonomischer Sicht, 30 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR UNTERNEHMENS-
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sichtsrat may have too many members for effective monitoring of risk, 
and the legally determined size of the Aufsichtsrat could curtail its 
supervision of management decisions.
79
  The Gesetz zur Angemes-
senheit der Vorstandsvergütung (VorstAG), or German Law on the 
Appropriateness of Executive Compensation, improves the responsi-
bilities of the Aufsichtsrat with regard to internal control and risk 
management.
80
  Regardless of these recent improvements, codeter-
mination may be a cumbersome vehicle for monitoring financial risk 
in German companies. 
On the other hand, the legal duties of Aufsichtsrat members 
may weigh in favor of mitigating risk.  The legal duties of the Aufsich-
tsrat derive from the duty of loyalty that each member of the Aufsich-
tsrat owes to the corporation.  German courts have concluded that 
the purpose of these legal duties is not to protect the shareholders as 
the only constituents but to protect the interests of the firm.
81
  Code-
termination in Germany further supports this perspective.  Non-
 
UND GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT [ZGR] [JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW] 110, 126–132 (2001) 
(Ger.).  See generally Gregory Jackson, Contested Boundaries: Ambiguity and Creativity in 
the Evolution of German Codetermination, in BEYOND CONTINUITY: INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 
IN ADVANCED POLITICAL ECONOMICS 229 (Wolfgang Streeck & Kathleen Thelen eds., 
2005); Mark J. Roe, German Co-Determination and German Securities Markets, in 
COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, THE STATE OF THE ART AND EMERGING 
RESEARCH 361 (Klaus J. Hopt et al. eds., 1998); Gary Gorton & Frank A. Schmid, Capi-
tal, Labor, and the Firm: A Study of German Codetermination, 2 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N 863 
(2004); Larry Fauver & Michael E. Fuerst, Does Good Corporate Governance Include Em-
ployee Representation? Evidence from German Corporate Boards (Maastricht Univ., Working 
Paper No. 1171, 2004), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/ 
SSRN_ID552822_code98845.pdf?abstractid=534422&mirid=1; Gregory Jackson, Em-
ployee Representation in the Board Compared: A Fuzzy Sets Analysis of Corporate Governance, 
Unionism and Political Institutions, 12 INDUSTRIELLE BEZIEHUNGEN, no. 3, 2005, available 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID800525_code287864.pdf? 
abstractid=800525&mirid=2; Wolfgang Schilling, Wirtschaftliche Mitbestimmung im 
Meinungsstreit, 128 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR DAS GESAMTE HANDELSCRECHT UND 
WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT [ZHR] [JOURNAL OF COMMERCIAL AND BUSINESS LAW] 217, 219–227 
(1966) (Ger.); Oliver Stettes, Unternehmensmitbestimmung in Deutschland—Vorteil oder 
Ballast im Standortwettbewerb?, 52 DIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT [AG] 611, 611–18 (2007) 
(Ger.); Herbert Wiedemann, Codetermination by Workers in German Enterprises, 28 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 79, 79 (1980); Christine Windbichler, Arbeitnehmerinteressen im Unternehmen 
und gegenüber dem Unternehmen—Eine Zwischenbilanz, 49 DIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT [AG] 
[Joint Stock Company] 190, 191 (2004) (Ger.). 
 79 See Jan Lieder, The German Supervisory Board on Its Way to Professionalism, 11 
GERMAN L.J. 115, 151–52 (1988).  The size of an Aufsichtsrat is negatively correlated 
with the frequency of Aufsichtsrat meetings—i.e., smaller Aufsichtsrat meet more 
frequently.  Less frequent coordination of the Aufsichtsrat in meetings and collective 
action problems may make supervision of risk taking of the Vorstand less effective.   
 80 Gesetz zur Angemessenheit der Vorstandsvergütung [VorstAG], June 19, 2009, 
BGBL I, at 2509 (Ger.).  
 81 See, e.g., 64 BGHZ 325 (329) (1975) (Ger.).  
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shareholder constituencies, such as employees and creditors, are of-
ten more averse to risk than shareholders, particularly diversified 
shareholders who can afford to see some companies fail if others do 
spectacularly well.  The Aufsichtsrat’s legal duty of loyalty to the firm 
as distinct from its shareholders thus may dictate a more conservative 
attitude toward risk than that of a shareholder oriented board of di-
rectors in the United States. 
The Aufsichtsrat is also different from the board of directors 
in the United States in that the Aufsichtsrat is primarily comprised of 
people who either work for the company, or work for banks, insur-
ance companies, or other financial institutions with strong business 
ties to the company.  The American concept of an “independent” di-
rector is relatively foreign to Germany—a difference between the two 
countries’ governance regimes that came to the fore when German 
companies with securities listed in the United States struggled to 
comply with the heightened independence requirements for direc-
tors and audit committees in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.
82
  Ger-
man Aufsichtsrat members may be more familiar with the business of 
the company than their American counterparts, but they rarely meet 
the American standard of independence, which emphasizes a direc-
tor’s lack of financial ties to the company.
83
  Recent events suggest 
that the United States might not have much to show for the particu-
lar type of independence it has insisted upon, making it even less 
likely that Germany and other countries will conform to U.S. corpo-
rate governance norms in this respect.  The recent failure of “inde-
pendent” director oversight at Lehman Brothers and other large U.S. 
financial firms suggests that independent directors cannot effectively 
monitor for risk if they are kept in the dark by the firm’s managers, 
accountants, lawyers, and other persons familiar with its business.  
Unless the United States changes its approach to independence, this 
 
 82 See Minodora D. Vancea, Exporting U.S. Corporate Governance Standards Through 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Unilateralism or Cooperation?, 53 DUKE L.J. 833, 842–43 (2003) 
(noting that since Germany’s Stock Corporation Act serves to minimize the problems 
targeted by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, it would be costly and inefficient for Germany to 
reconcile the regulations imposed by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Germany’s Stock 
Corporation Law); Klaus J. Hopt, Modern Company and Capital Market Problems: Improv-
ing European Corporate Governance after Enron 461 (European Corporate Governance 
Inst., Working Paper No. 05/2002, 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=356102 (recognizing that the independence require-
ments of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act may create considerable problems for Germany in 
light of its two-tiered board system and labor codetermination).  See generally Georg 
Lanfermann & Silja Maul, Auswirkungen des Sarbanes-Oxley Acts in Deutschland, 55 DER 
BETRIEB (DB) 1725 (2002) (Ger.).  The Sarbanes-Oxley Act is located at Pub. L. No. 
107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002). 
 83 See Hopt, supra note 82. 
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is an area where corporate governance norms in the United States 
and Germany may continue to diverge. 
United States and German methods of raising equity capital 
and debt financing also differ.  U.S. corporations rely heavily on capi-
tal markets, whether for selling their stock, long-term bonds, or short-
term commercial paper.  This makes U.S. companies particularly vul-
nerable to market conditions and thus to financial risks that correlate 
with markets.
84
  This may also make managers of U.S. companies 
more aware of market conditions and in some circumstances more 
aware of market risks.  Historically, U.S. companies have relied on 
markets for financing more than they have relied on each other, 
meaning U.S. managers are perhaps less aware than they should be of 
the risks that are being incurred by companies other than their own.  
With the growth of markets for swaps and other complex instru-
ments, however, the fate of U.S. companies is directly vulnerable to 
conditions at other companies in addition to overall market condi-
tions.  For example, several companies, including Goldman Sachs, 
were owed billions of dollars by AIG—money they were paid only af-
ter the federal government bailed out AIG.  U.S. managers, who were 
not used to assessing levels of risk in companies other than their own, 
may not have been prepared for this. 
Because of their reliance on capital markets, U.S. companies 
also are vulnerable to short-term demands of shareholders.  Manag-
ers struggle to meet shareholder expectations, and sometimes incur 
risks when they feel it is necessary to satisfy shareholders.  The long-
term health of the company may be secondary and the interests of 
creditors, who are not represented in the boardroom, also may be 
given less attention. 
German companies, by contrast, rely on a combination of 
public markets and institutional financing for capital.  Historically the 
emphasis has been on bank financing.  Managers of one corporation 
have a direct interest in risks assumed by other corporations.  Ger-
man managers have developed a method for monitoring each other’s 
risks through interlocking boards of directors, cross-ownership of 
large blocks of shares, and other mechanisms.  How effective these 
mechanisms are in helping directors monitor for risk is debatable.  
But on its face, the German system of corporate governance appears 
 
 84 In 2008 a severe liquidity crisis occurred, and investors for a time stopped buy-
ing commercial paper.  Edmund L. Andrews & Michael M. Grynbaum, Fed Announces 
Plan to Buy Short-Term Debt, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2008/10/08/business/08fed.html?ref=commercial_paper. 
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to facilitate the flow of information about different companies as well 
as the influence of different companies upon one another. 
For all of the reasons discussed above, it is not surprising that 
Germany and the United States have very different ways of approach-
ing risk in the banking sector.  Germany and the United States are 
likely to follow different paths in defining “excessive risk” and in their 
legal, institutional, and social mechanisms used to control risk. 
IV. SOME SPECIFICS ON THE U.S. AND GERMAN APPROACHES TO 
EXCESSIVE RISK TAKING BY DIRECTORS 
A. The Business Judgment Rule 
Decisions of directors about business risks, if challenged in 
court, are analyzed under the business judgment rule in both Ger-
many and the United States.  The business judgment rule is a concept 
in corporate law, whereby “directors of [a] corporation are clothed 
with [the] presumption . . . of being [motivated] in their conduct by 
a bona fide regard for the interests of the corporation whose affairs the 
stockholders have committed to their charge.”
85
  Unless the presump-
tion has been rebutted, courts refuse to second-guess the actions of 
directors in managing the corporation, unless it is shown that the di-
rectors were grossly negligent in violating their duty of care to man-
age the corporation to the best of their abilities.
86
 
Germany, among other nations,
87
 modeled its business judg-
ment rule after the American business judgment rule.  Some of the 
countries that adopted the American business judgment rule, such as 
Australia, have introduced a statutory business judgment rule.
88
  In 
Germany, the business judgment rule is code based in the Aktienge-
setz (AktG).
89
  The business judgment rule in the United States by 
 
 85 Robinson v. Pittsburgh Oil Refining Corp., 126 A. 46, 48 (Del. Ch. 1924). 
 86 Another approach is to articulate the presumption that the directors acted 
with due care, or “on an informed basis,” as part of the presumption of the business 
judgment rule itself, a presumption which can then be rebutted by a plaintiff chal-
lenging the directors’ actions.  See In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 
A.2d 106, 124 (2009).  
 87 Australia, for example, decided to implement the business judgment rule into 
their Corporate Codes. See Corporations Act 2001 s 180 (Austl.); Joan Gabel et al., 
Evolving Regulation of Corporate Governance and the Implications for D&O Liability: The 
United States and Australia, 11 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 365, 398 (2010) (discussing how 
Australia’s code utilizes the business judgment rule).  
 88 Id. 
 89 Aktiengesetz [AktG] [German Stock Corporation Act], Sept. 6, 1965, BGBL. I 
at 1089, § 93(1)–(2) (Ger.).  
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contrast is articulated principally through case law in the state of in-
corporation.
90
 
In the United States, attempts to implement a statutory busi-
ness judgment rule have been unsuccessful.
91
  In 1994, the American 
Law Institute attempted to provide black letter law for the business 
judgment rule in its Principles of Corporate Governance.
92
  The draf-
ters of the Revised Model Business Corporation Act in 1998, however, 
decided that it would not be desirable to “freeze the concept in a sta-
tute.”
93
  The business judgment rule in the United States thus remains 
embedded in case law.
94
  The business judgment rule in most states 
embodies a rebuttable presumption that management has acted: (i) 
in good faith, (ii) in the best interest of the corporation and absent a 
conflict of interest, (iii) on an informed basis, and (iv) for a proper 
business purpose, which precludes extreme examples of waste of cor-
porate assets.
95
 
The German business judgment rule has five requirements: 
(i) a business decision by management, (ii) for the benefit of the 
corporation, (iii) no conflict of interest, (iv) based on sufficient in-
 
 90 See, e.g., In re Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 124.  The state of incorporation is not nec-
essarily the state where the company has its headquarters.  Many large U.S. corpora-
tions are incorporated in Delaware. 
 91 Thomas J. Dougherty, Securities Litigation: Planning and Strategies, SM086 A.L.I.–
A.B.A., 327, 339 (June 7–8, 2007) (discussing Delaware, which has not adopted a 
business judgment rule statute, whereas forty-one states have passed statutes affecting 
how judges can apply the business judgment rule).  Similarly, in 2000, the British 
Commission for the Reform of Company Law decided against the implementation of 
a statutory business judgment rule.  See COMPANY LAW REVIEW, MODERN COMPANY LAW 
FOR A COMPETITIVE ECONOMY: DEVELOPING THE FRAMEWORK § 3.69, at 42 (2000) availa-
ble at ht tp://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file23248.pdf.  The British government in De-
cember 2003, again, attempted unsuccessfully the introduction of the U.S. business 
judgment rule.  DEP’T TRADE & INDUS., DIRECTOR AND AUDITOR LIABILITY–A 
CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT § 5.4–5.13, at 17–21 (2003), available at 
http://www.treasurers.org/system/files/auditors_directors.pdf. 
 92 A.L.I PRIN. CORP. GOV. § 4.01 (1994).  
 93 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §8.31 cmt. 1 (2002).  Interestingly, the business judg-
ment rule is discussed in the Corporate Director’s Guide Book.  See AM. BAR ASS’N, 
CORPORATE DIRECTOR’S GUIDEBOOK 25–27 (5th ed. 2007).  
 94 See, e.g., Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 186 (Del. 1988); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 
488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984); Sin-
clair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971); Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 
170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919); Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int’l Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1052 
(Del. Ch. 1996); Kaplan v. Centex Corp., 284 A.2d 119, 124 (Del. Ch. 1971); Gimbel 
v. Signal Cos., 316 A.2d 599, 608 (Del. Ch. 1974); Robinson v. Pittsburgh Oil Refinery 
Corp., 126 A. 46, 48–49 (Del. Ch. 1926).  
 95 See Cottle v. Storer Commc’n, Inc., 849 F.2d 570, 575 (11th Cir. 1988); Grobow 
v. Perot, 539 A.2d at 187; Brock Built, LLC v. Blake, 686 S.E.2d 425, 822 (Ga. Ct. App. 
2009). 
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formation, and—perhaps most important for the present analysis—
(v) a no “hazard” decision or no excessive risk taking.
96
  As pointed 
out below, it is in this last element where the business judgment rules 
in the United States and in Germany diverge the most.  German law 
presumes no hazard and excessive risk, but this presumption can be 
rebutted.  Law in the United States principally focuses on corporate 
“waste” and presumes the absence of corporate “waste.”
97
  The prin-
cipal factual inquiry asks whether that presumption can be rebutted.  
Because most risk taking does not meet the definition of corporate 
waste, a showing of hazard or excessive risk is insufficient to rebut the 
business judgment rule in the United States.
98
 
B. The German Approach to the Business Judgment Rule 
Although many of the elements of the business judgment rule 
are similar in the United States and Germany, we briefly summarize 
the German approach which is unfamiliar to most American readers. 
1. Business Decision of Management 
A primary predicate of the business judgment rule is that 
management made a business decision.
99
  A business decision under 
the business judgment rule requires that management could act one 
way or another in a given situation or not act at all.
100
  The business 
decision must be a discretionary one for the business judgment rule 
to apply.  There is no discretion if the decision was required by a duty 
of the officer or director under laws, bylaws, or contracts.
101
  If the of-
 
 96 Aktiengesetz [AktG] [German Stock Corporation Act], Sept. 6, 1965, BGBL. I 
at 1089, § 93(1)–(2); Marcus Lutter, Die Business Judgment Rule und ihre praktische 
Anwendung, 18 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT [ZIP] [JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW] 
841, 843–45 (2007) (Ger.). 
 97 In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 74 (Del. 2006).  
To recover on a claim of corporate waste, the plaintiffs must shoulder 
the burden of proving that the exchange was so one sided that no 
business person of ordinary, sound judgment could conclude that the 
corporation has received adequate consideration.  A claim of waste will 
arise only in the rare, unconscionable case where directors irrationally 
squander or give away corporate assets.  This onerous standard for 
waste is a corollary of the proposition that where business judgment 
presumptions are applicable, the board’s decision will be upheld unless 
it cannot be attributed to any rational business purpose. 
Id. (citations omitted).    
 98 See, e.g., In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 131 (Del. 
Ch. 2009).  
 99 See Lutter, supra note 96, at 843.  
 100 See id.  
 101 HOLGER FLEICHER, HANDBUCH DES VORSTANDRECHTS 258 (2006) (Ger.). 
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ficer or director breached a specific duty or acted illegally, he or she 
has not acted with discretion and the business judgment rule does 
not apply.  For instance, there is no discretion for management to 
usurp a business opportunity of the corporation, emit chemical sub-
stances into public waters despite a legal ban, or neglect the disclo-
sure of material information as required by law.
102
  If the officer or di-
rector did not act with discretion, the actions of management are not 
covered by the business judgment rule. 
The U.S. business judgment rule does not require a business 
“decision” of management per se as a necessary element of the rule.  
It is implied, however, that management acted or the rule would not 
be at issue.  Other elements of “discretion” in the U.S. business 
judgment rule fall under specific components of the rule (i.e. the di-
rectors acting for a “proper business purpose”).  A doctrinal defini-
tion of “acting” does not seem to be necessary—or at least is not em-
phasized—in the United States. 
2. For the Benefit of the Corporation 
In Germany, the second element of the business judgment 
rule requires managers to reasonably believe they acted exclusively 
for the benefit of the corporation.
103
  For instance, management does 
not act for the benefit of the corporation if its actions threaten the 
existence and economic survival of the corporation because, in those 
circumstances, management cannot reasonably expect to act for the 
benefit of the corporation.
104
  Or, if a parent company forces a subsid-
iary in a group structure to make permanent changes that lead to cost 
inefficiencies and economic decline of the subsidiary, such actions 
would not be for the benefit of the subsidiary although they techni-
cally may be permitted under German group structure law. 
Similarly, the U.S. business judgment rule presumes that 
management intended to act in the best interest of the corporation.
105
  
In the United States, however, this component of the rule is con-
strued principally to mean an absence of conflict of interest—that the 
managers were acting in the best interests of the corporation and not 
 
 102 Lutter, supra note 96, at 843.  
 103 ARAG/GARMENBECK, Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshoffs in Zivilsachen 
[BGHZ] [Federal court of Justice], Apr. 21, 1997, 135, 244, 253 (Ger.).  Before the 
Court articulated the German business judgment rule, the highest German Civil 
Court in 1930 already had required that the director’s decision must be for the bene-
fit of the corporation.  See id. 
 104 Lutter, supra note 96, at 844.  
 105 See In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 124 (Del. Ch. 
2009). 
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another person or entity other than the corporation.
106
  Provided the 
directors have no demonstrable personal conflict of interest or a con-
flict of interest from another corporation or some third party whose 
interests are being furthered at the expense of the corporation, they 
are presumed to be acting for the corporation’s best interests.
107
  U.S. 
courts generally do not inquire into whether managers acted in a 
manner that threatened the economic survival of the corporation, al-
though managers may not engage in a complete waste of corporate 
assets (disposition of assets without receiving anything of value in re-
turn) and may not make some managerial decisions—such as stock 
buybacks—in circumstances where the corporation is in fact already 
insolvent.
108
 
3. No Conflicts of Interest 
A third requirement of the German business judgment rule is 
that directors and officers cannot act in circumstances that would 
amount to a conflict of interest.  A classic example of a conflict of in-
terest in this context is a CEO of a corporation who desires to hire his 
wife for a radio advertisement of a company product.
109
  Unless the 
wife obtains a contract with provisions that would be in line with cus-
tom and industry standards or other precedent, the decision to hire 
the wife may be a conflict of interest transaction.  Interestingly, this 
requirement has no foundation in either the ARAG decision by the 
Bundesgerichtshof
110
 or in the code-based version of the German 
business judgment rule.
111
 German academic literature, however, 
concludes that management decisions that were made while a con-
flict of interest existed cannot fulfill the requirement that manage-
ment acted exclusively for the benefit of the corporation.
112
  This view 
is in accordance with the legislative intent behind the AktG.
113
 
 
 106 See, e.g., Gagliardi v. Trifoods Int’l, 683 A.2d 1049, 1052 (Del. Ch. 1996).  
 107 Id. 
 108 See generally In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006); 
Gagliardi v. Trifoods Int’l, 683 A.2d 1049.  
 109 This case arose in U.S. courts.  See Bayer v. Beran, 49 N.Y.S.2d 2 (1944).  
 110 See BGHZ 135, 244 (Ger.). 
 111 Aktiengesetz [AktG] [German Stock Corporation Act], Sept. 6, 1965, BGBL. I 
at 1089, § 93(1)–(2). 
 112 See supra Part IV.B.2 (second requirement of the German Business Rule).  
Holger Fleischer, Die “Business Judgment Rule”: Vom Richterrecht zur Kodifizierung, 9 
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT [ZIP] [JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW] 685, 691 
(2004) (Ger.). 
 113 Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Unternehmensintegrität und Modernisierung des 
Anfechtungsrechts [UMAG] [BR] 3/05, at 20 (Ger.).  
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The business judgment rule in the United States also requires 
that directors not act out of a conflict of interest.
114
  Indeed, showing 
a conflict of interest is probably the most common way of rebutting 
the business judgment rule presumption in the United States. 
4. Based on Sufficient Information 
The requirement that directors and officers have sufficient in-
formation before they act is a crucial element of the German business 
judgment rule.
115
  The sufficiency of information depends on the sig-
nificance of the pending business decision.  For instance, if manage-
ment decides to purchase a new computer for the office, it may be 
sufficient that management obtain competing offers from different 
vendors.  More extensive information including market research re-
ports, due diligence, and fairness opinions, among other documenta-
tion, are required if management of a German corporation decides 
to acquire a foreign company.
116
  This requirement is based on the 
understanding that if the corporation is not protected by the person-
al liability of the individual board members who act on its behalf, 
then the decisions of board members must be planned well and 
based on sufficient information in order to protect the corporation 
from the implicit risks.
117
 
The German legislature has extended the protection of the 
business judgment rule to corporate managers’ selection and weigh-
ing of information, an approach which avoids “hindsight bias” of 
judges.
118
  The legislature reasoned that time pressure in decision-
making ought to be taken into account and may justify collecting less 
information before making a business decision.
119
  Other criteria are 
profitability of a business decision, risk parameters, amount of in-
 
 114 See Bayer v. Beran, N.Y.S.2d 2, 6-7 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1944) (“The ‘business 
judgment rule’, however, yields to the rule of undivided loyalty . . . . Such personal 
transactions of directors with their corporations, such transactions as may tend to 
produce a conflict between self-interest and fiduciary obligation, are, when 
challenged, examined with the most scrupulous care, and if there is any evidence of 
improvidence or oppression, any indication of unfairness or undue advantage, the 
transactions will be voided.”). 
 115 BGHZ 135, 244, 253 (Ger.). 
 116 Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Higher Regional Court], June 22, 2006, BETRIEBS 
BERATER [BB] 66, 2007 (Ger). 
 117 Lutter, supra note 96, at 844.  
 118 Fleischer, supra note 101, at 686.  
 119 Lutter, supra note 96, at 845. 
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vestment, and financing requirements, as they may impact business 
decisions immediately.
120
  
In the United States, this component of the business judg-
ment rule is often articulated as a requirement that the director acted 
on an “informed basis.”
121
  A business decision must be based on suffi-
cient information.
122
  This requirement, however, is watered down in 
the United States by many states that allow corporations to adopt 
charter provisions that exculpate the directors from liability to the 
corporation for breach of a duty of care, including the duty to act on 
an informed basis.
123
 
5. No Excessive Risk Taking—No Hazard Decision 
Finally, excessively risky decisions by directors that may lead to 
the demise of the corporation are not protected by the German busi-
ness judgment rule.
124
  The Bundesgerichtshof, or BGH (the highest 
German court in civil matters), confirmed that a “hazard decision” by 
management is not protected by the business judgment rule if “the 
ability to take conscious business risks by management has been ir-
responsibly overstretched.”
125
  The application of this component of 
the business judgment rule in an environment of increased systemic 
risk, such as the recent credit crisis, is unclear.
126
  The BGH in its 
ARAG decision
127
 determined that the German business judgment 
rule
128
 will not cover informed business decisions by management if 
“conscious business risk has been inappropriately excessive”
129
—i.e., 
no manager, regardless of whether the manager is a bank officer or 
board member, acts reasonably if he or she takes on risks on behalf of 
the corporation that, if realized, will result in the demise of the cor-
poration.
130
 
There is no equivalent to this component in the U.S. business 
judgment rule.  One could argue that if directors act on an informed 
 
 120 Id. 
 121 See In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 124 (2009). 
 122 See Smith v. Van Gorkum, 488 A.2d 858, 872–73 (1985).  
 123 See Del. Gen. Corp. Law § 102(b)(7) (2010); 805 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 
5/2.10(b)(3) (West 2010); N.J. Stat. Ann. 14A:2-7(3) (West 2010).  
 124 Lutter, supra note 96, at 845.  
 125 BGHZ 135, 244, 253 (Ger.). 
 126 See generally Lutter, supra note 96.  
 127 BGHZ 135, 244 (Ger.); ZIP 883 (Ger.).   
 128 Now embodied in Aktiengesetz [AktG] [German Stock Corporation Act], Sept. 
6, 1965, BGBL. I at 1089, § 93(1)–(2) (Ger.). 
 129 BGHZ 135, 244, 253(Ger.); ZIP 883, 886 (Ger.). 
 130 Lutter, supra note 5, at 199.  
KAAL PAINTER_FINAL_11.10.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/16/2010  12:33 PM 
1466 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:1433 
basis, as required by the U.S. business judgment rule, they should at 
least know about the risks the company takes and monitor those risks.  
However, in an opinion that provided the first detailed analysis of po-
tential liability of directors for losses incurred as a result of substantial 
exposure to subprime debt, the Delaware Court of Chancery held 
otherwise.
131
 
In In re Citigroup Inc. Shareholder Derivative Litigation, the Dela-
ware Chancery Court upheld the business judgment rule and its pro-
tection of directors’ business decisions in the face of worldwide eco-
nomic losses, finding that directors’ duties to monitor for illegal 
conduct in some situations under the Caremark132 line of cases would 
not be extended to impose oversight liability for business risk.
133
  
Shareholder plaintiffs alleged (1) breach of fiduciary duties for fail-
ing to properly monitor and manage the risk that Citigroup faced 
concerning problems in the subprime lending market, and (2) fail-
ure to properly disclose the company’s exposure regarding subprime 
assets.
134
  According to the complaint, starting in May 2005, “red flags” 
should have immediately alerted the defendants to problems in the 
real estate and credit markets.
135
  Therefore, by ignoring these warn-
ing signs, the defendants allegedly overemphasized short-term profits 
and sacrificed the long-term viability of Citigroup.
136
  According to the 
Delaware Chancery court, however, oversight liability can only be es-
tablished if the plaintiff can show that “the directors knew that they 
were not discharging their fiduciary [duties] or that the directors 
demonstrated a conscious disregard for their responsibilities . . . .”
137
  
Inability to predict the future and an incorrect evaluation of business 
risk were not violations of a director’s oversight responsibilities.  Risk 
is inherent in maximizing shareholder value, and losses in and of 
themselves do not suffice to hold directors personally liable for taking 
risks that lead to losses. 
In contrast with In re Citigroup, the German Bundesgerich-
tshof, more than ten years earlier in 1997, elaborated in its ARAG de-
cision that business decisions by directors are not protected by the 
 
 131 See In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 139–40 (Del. 
Ch. 2009). 
 132 In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A 2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996) (ex-
panding the directors’ duty of care to include a duty to monitor for illegal conduct). 
 133 See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A2d 362 (2006) (reaffirming the Caremark duties).  
 134 In re Citigroup Inc., at 111. 
 135 Id. at 114.  
 136 Id. at 111.  
 137 Id. at 123.  
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German business judgment rule if “business risk was inappropriately 
excessive.”
138
  In the context of the 2008 credit and banking crisis, 
German commentators—relied upon by courts more extensively than 
their counterparts are in the United States—have concluded that no 
manager acts reasonably in terms of the business judgment rule if he 
or she takes risks on behalf of the corporation that, if realized, result 
in the demise of the corporation.
139
  As of this writing it is unclear 
how courts will apply this concept to the events of the 2008 financial 
crisis.  In particular, it remains to be seen how much influence hind-
sight bias will have on judicial decisions regarding which risks are 
covered by the German business judgment rule.  For example, will 
the fact that a particular risk led to the demise of a corporation be 
sufficient to abrogate the business judgment rule protection of man-
agers’ decision to take that risk, or will German courts instead ex-
amine the decision ex-ante and assess whether the managers could 
reasonably have foreseen the risk as likely to cause the corporation’s 
demise? 
C. Securities Disclosure 
One way of addressing excessive risk taking is to require that 
it be disclosed to a financial institution’s stockholders, bondholders, 
and other investors so they can decide for themselves how much risk 
is too much.  Investors who are told about risk and think it is unwise 
can sell their investments.  They can vote out directors who allow 
managers to assume too much risk, or they can pressure managers to 
change their approach to risk.  For investors to have an opportunity 
to take these steps, they must know about the risk.  In a mandatory 
disclosure regime, the law requires that a minimum amount of in-
formation be publicly disclosed.  Securities fraud laws also forbid ma-
terial misrepresentations about risk and other facts that an investor 
would consider important in making a decision.
140
 
Both the United States and Germany require public compa-
nies to disclose information about their financial condition to share-
holders.  Here, however, the United States probably has the stricter 
requirements as well as the more vigorous enforcement regime.  Part 
of the difficulty for German securities disclosure is that Germany has, 
to some extent, waited for the European Union (EU) to develop a 
 
 138 BGHZ 135, 244 (Ger.).  
 139 See Lutter, supra note 5, at 199.  
 140 See TSC Industries v. Northway, 426 U.S. 438, 441–43 (1976); see also Basic Inc 
v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231–232 (1988) (setting forth this definition of “materiali-
ty”). 
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comprehensive approach to disclosure, and the EU is still working 
toward coordination in corporate disclosure requirements.  The EU 
has no central agency for securities regulation,
141
 and there is no cen-
tralized system like the EDGAR Database of Online Corporate Finan-
cial Information
142
 for continuous disclosure of pertinent information 
to investors.  Only recently have European countries introduced 
mandatory and continuous issuer disclosure.
143
  Such disclosure in 
Europe is often self-regulated rather than enforced by a government 
regulator.
144
  The European Parliament and the European Commis-
sion have attempted to address disparate regulation and lack of en-
forcement in individual European member states by adopting the 
Market Abuse Directive,
145
 the Transparency Directive,
146
 the Markets 
in Financial Instruments Directive,
147
 and the Prospectus Directive.
148
  
Despite many improvements,
149
 the directives do not mandate cohe-
rent and comprehensive disclosure, and issuers continue to make 
disclosures in disparate ways.
150
  Some scholars have argued that there 
is a need for a European SEC.
151
  European investors continue to 
struggle to find material information about European companies, 
 
 141 The Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR) is an independent 
committee of European Union member states’ securities regulators, but it has no en-
forcement powers.  See CESR, http://www.cesr-eu.org/index.php?page=cesrinshort& 
mac=0&id=) (last visited Aug. 16, 2010).  
 142 EDGAR Database of Online Corporate Financial Information, U.S. SECURITIES AND 
EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/edgar.shtml (last visited Aug. 30, 2010).  
 143 See Iris H-Y Chiu, Delegated Regulatory Administration in Mandatory Disclosure—
Some Observations from EU Securities Regulation, 40 INT’L LAW. 737, 737 (2006).  
 144 See id. at 746. 
 145 Council Directive 2003/6, art. 6, 2003 O.J. (L 96) 16 (EC). 
 146 Council Directive 2004/109, 2004 O.J. (L 390) 38 (EC). 
 147 Council Directive 2004/39, 2004 O.J. (L 145) 1 (EC). 
 148 Council Directive 2003/71, 2003 O.J. (L 345) 64 (EC). 
 149 Generally, the improvement has occurred in the Markets in Financial Instru-
ments Directive.  See François P. Haas, The Markets in Financial Instruments Directive: 
Banking on Market and Supervisory Efficiency 4 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper 
No. 07/250, 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=1087165. 
 150 See Chiu, supra note 143, at 767–68. 
 151 See generally Yannis Avgerinos, The Need and the Rationale for a European Securities 
Regulator, in FINANCIAL MARKETS IN EUROPE: TOWARDS A SINGLE REGULATOR 83 (Mads 
Andenas & Yannis Avgerinos eds., 2003); Gilles Thieffry, The Case for a European Secur-
ities Commission, in REGULATING FINANCIAL SERVICES AND MARKETS IN THE 21ST CENTURY 
211 (Ellís Ferran & Charles A.E. Goodhart eds., 2001); Roberta S. Karmel, The Case 
for a European Securities Commission, 38 COLUM. J. TRANS. L. 9 (1999); Eric Pan, Harmo-
nization of U.S.-EU Securities Regulation: The Case for a European Securities Regulator, 34 
LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 499 (2003).  
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and even if they find appropriate sources, the information may be in-
complete.
152
 
Given the state of securities regulation in Europe, European 
investors arguably are more exposed to securities fraud than U.S. in-
vestors.  On the other hand, the financial crisis of 2008 revealed a 
substantial amount of risk in U.S. issuers that was not disclosed to in-
vestors.  The Lehman Brothers bankruptcy alone revealed two serious 
disclosure lapses for a U.S. company.  The first was the “Repo 105” 
transaction whereby Lehman “sold” poorly performing assets to a 
London bank for cash at the end of each quarter; the assets were va-
lued at 105% of the cash payment, which apparently qualified the 
transaction as a sale under English law.
153
  The cash was used to pay 
down Lehman’s debt and improve its balance sheet.
154
  Coupled with 
the sale was a “repurchase” commitment from Lehman whereby a few 
days after the end of the quarter the transaction was reversed and the 
same assets were bought back from the bank for cash which Lehman 
again borrowed, increasing its debt.
155
  The same transaction was re-
peated at the end of the next quarter, allowing each quarter’s finan-
cial statements to show less debt than Lehman actually had.
156
  The 
total amount of money involved may have been as much as $50 bil-
lion.
157
  The second disclosure lapse involved a “captive company” 
called Hudson Castle, which was set up by former Lehman Brothers 
 
 152 See Chiu, supra note 143, at 767–68.  
Although Europe has seen increased securities regulation recently with 
the adoption of the Prospectus Directive, the Market Abuse Directive, 
the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive, and the Transparency 
Directive, the problem with these new rules is that issuers are still per-
mitted to make disclosures in disparate ways.  This means that investors 
may not be able to find material information on companies in which 
they invest, and even if they do, the information they find may be in-
complete. 
Shelley Thompson, The Globalization of Securities Markets: Effects on Investor Protection, 41 
INT’L. LAW. 1121, 1128 (2007) (citing Iris H-Y Chiu, supra note 143, at 767).  Howev-
er, Europe-wide uniform securities prospectus rules are expected to improve disclo-
sure requirements in Europe.  See Harold S. Bloomenthal & Samuel Wolff, Internatio-
nalization of World Capital Markets–Multinational Enterprises, 10 INT.’L CAP. MARKETS & 
SEC. REG. § 2:3 n.66 (2010) (“[T]he EEC Commission’s proposed European-wide 
uniform securities prospectus rules will greatly facilitate the disclosure and dissemi-
nation of information necessary for investor protection and informed investment de-
cisions, and should ease regulatory restrictions currently precluding foreign access to 
domestic capital markets.”).  
 153 Report of Anton R. Valukas supra note 32, at 6–7.  
 154 Id. 
 155 Id. at 6. 
 156 Id. at 6–7. 
 157 Id. at 6. 
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employees specifically for the purpose of buying poorly performing 
assets from Lehman; Hudson Castle’s close association with Lehman 
was not disclosed.
158
  Hudson nonetheless showed up at the Lehman 
bankruptcy claiming billions of dollars of obligations owed to it by 
Lehman.
159
 
These and other examples, including the Enron and 
WorldCom failures in 2001 and 2002, illustrate potential weakness in 
the supposedly rigorous U.S. disclosure regime.  Public companies 
that engage in highly complex transactions as a matter of course can 
easily conceal risky transactions from investors.  Indeed, management 
can also conceal these transactions from the company’s own direc-
tors.
160
  Although financial institutions in Germany also engage in 
highly complex transactions, to the extent financial innovation in the 
United States is ahead of that in Germany, the U.S. disclosure regime 
may be more vulnerable to misrepresentation and fraud. 
The one aspect of U.S. securities laws that is substantially 
harsher than its German counterpart is the private litigation regime 
in which investors sue in class actions for securities fraud.  In securi-
ties class actions, U.S. law allows plaintiffs to proceed on the basis of 
the “fraud on the market theory” rather than requiring plaintiffs to 
prove actual reliance on misleading statements.
161
  This approach has 
been rejected in most other countries.
162
  The application of Section 
10(b) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act
163
 and Rule 10b-5
164
 in con-
junction with the fraud on the market theory makes it relatively easy 
to certify a plaintiff class for litigation and thus substantially increases 
the potential liability of issuers.
165
  Lawyers who file unsuccessful law-
suits in the United States are not liable for the defendants’ attorneys’ 
fees, yet fee awards for successful plaintiffs’ lawyers are very generous, 
 
 158 See Louise Story & Eric Dash, Lehman Channeled Risks Through ‘Alter Ego’ Firm, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 2010, at A1.  Lehman did not have a sufficient equity interest in 
Hudson Castle to require consolidation of the two companies’ balance sheets under 
GAAP. 
 159 Id. 
 160 The bankruptcy examiner for Lehman Brothers found that the company’s out-
side directors had not breached their fiduciary duty to the company because they 
apparently had never been told about the above transactions and other problems 
with Lehman’s exposure to risk.  Report of Anton R. Valukas, supra note 32, at 54–58. 
 161 See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241–42 (1988). 
 162 See Hannah L. Buxbaum, Multinational Class Actions Under Federal Securities Law: 
Managing Jurisdictional Conflict, 46 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 14, 61–62 (2007). 
 163 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78lll (2006). 
 164 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2009).  
 165 See Cristof Aha & Jens Föderer, Die RocheEntscheidung des U.S. Court of Appeals, 
49 RECHT DER INTERNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFT [RIW] 450, 455 (2003) (Ger.). 
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sometimes running into the billions of dollars.
166
  Although Congress 
significantly tightened up pleading requirements, limited damages, 
and took other pro-defendant steps in the 1995 Private Securities Lit-
igation Reform Act,
167
 the United States remains the most attractive 
regime in the world for class action securities litigation.
168
  Indeed, 
foreign plaintiffs have sought to use U.S. courts to sue foreign defen-
dants over securities purchased outside the United States (so-called f-
cubed litigation) until the U.S. Supreme Court decided in June 2010 
that U.S. securities laws do not cover securities bought or sold outside 
the United States.
169
  In the 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act, Congress almost immediately thereafter 
gave the SEC the authority to pursue conduct in the United States 
that defrauds investors outside the United States.
170
  It is unclear how 
the SEC will use this authority and how much cooperation there will 
be between the SEC and securities regulators in Germany and else-
where in combating securities fraud. 
In Germany, class actions for securities fraud are virtually 
nonexistent. Unlike many of its European neighbors, Germany has 
elected to provide for group litigation only in a few substantive law 
areas, such as environmental law, and in most group litigation cases, 
German law only provides for injunctive relief.
171
  Section 148(1) of 
the German Corporation Act (Aktiengesetz, or AktG), however, was 
amended by the German legislature in 2005 as part of the Integrity of 
Corporations and Modernization Act (Gesetz zur Unternehmensin-
 
 166 See Jay N. Varon, Promoting Settlements and Limiting Litigation Costs by Means of the 
Offer of Judgment: Some Suggestions for Using and Revising Rule 68, 33 AM. U. L. REV. 813, 
818–19 (1984) (noting that the dichotomy between winning plaintiff who is eligible 
for attorneys’ fees and the defendant who not is eligible favors plaintiff’s decisions 
not to settle). 
 167 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).  
 168 Bradley J. Bondi, Facilitating Economic Recovery and Sustainable Growth Through 
Reform of the Securities Class-Action System: Exploring Arbitration as an Alternative to Litiga-
tion, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 607, 609 (2010) (discussing hindrances to capital 
formation as a result of the fact that the United States is one of few developed na-
tions to allow class action securities litigation). 
 169 See Morrison v. National Australia Bank, 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010).  For commen-
tary on the dangers facing European companies in the context of Morrison and pend-
ing changes in the U.S. Congress, see Wulf A. Kaal & Richard W. Painter, Extraterri-
torial Application of US Securities Law—Will the US Become the Default Jurisdiction for 
European Securities Litigation?, 7 EUR. CO. L. 90 (2010). 
 170 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203 § 929P(c)(2) (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act]. 
 171 Harald Koch, Non-Class Group Litigation Under EU and German Law, 11 DUKE J. 
COMP. & INT’L L. 355, 358 (2001).  
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tegrität und Modernisierung des Anfechtungsrechts 2005, or 
UMAG).
172
  Section § 148(1) of the AktG, as amended by the UMAG, 
introduces the derivative suit in Germany and gives minority share-
holders the right to sue management in certain circumstances.
173
  
This may be perceived as a tightening of the standard of care in 
Germany as it introduced the possibility for shareholders to sue on 
behalf of the corporation for wrongdoing of management.  Unlike 
the derivative suit in the United States, however, section 148(1) of the 
AktG requires a threshold ownership of shares totaling €100,000 
(about $127,090) for shareholders to have standing to sue on behalf 
of the corporation in German courts.
174
  This ownership requirement 
for derivative suits is arguably counter-balanced by the introduction 
of other methods of recovering against directors, such as the 2009 
Gesetz zur Angemessenheit der Vorstandsvergütung (VorstAG) provi-
sions for liability and compensation reduction that are discussed be-
low.
175
 
 
 172 Gesetz zur Unternehmensintegrität und Modernisierung des Anfech-
tungsrechts [UMAG] [Law on Company Integrity and Modernization of the Right to 
Appeal], Sept. 22, 2005,  BGBL. I at 2802 (Ger.).  
 173 Aktiengesetz [AktG] [German Stock Corporation Act], Sept. 6, 1965, BGBL. I 
at 1089, § 148(1). (Ger.).  
Proceedings for Admission of Legal Action: 
Shareholders whose shares amount to a total of one hundredth of the 
share capital or a pro rata amount of 100,000 euros on the date of fil-
ing an application, may apply for a claim for damages accruing to the 
company to be admitted in their own name as specified under § 
147(1), first sentence. The court will admit such claim if: 
1.  the shareholders furnish evidence that their shares were ac-
quired prior to the date on which they, or in the event of 
universal succession their predecessor, should have become 
aware of the alleged violation of obligations or the alleged 
damages following public disclosure of the same, 
2.  the shareholders furnish evidence that they have, to no 
avail, set a reasonable deadline for the company to file a 
claim in its own name 
3.   there are facts which justify the suspicion that the company 
has incurred damages as a result of dishonesty or gross 
breach of the law or of the company’s articles of association, 
and 
4. there are no prevailing interests on the part of the company 
providing grounds to prevent enforcement of the claim. 
Id., translated in Dieter Hahn, Aktiengesetz, RELATIV-KOMFORTABEL, http://www.relativ-
komfortabel.de/148aktg.php, http://www.relativ-komfortabel.de/sec-148aktg.php.  
 174 Id.  
 175 See Gesetz zur Angemessenheit der Vorstandsvergütung [VorstAG] [Act on the 
Appropriateness of Executive Board Compensation], Aug. 31, 2009, BGBL. I, at 2509 
(Ger.), available at http://www.bmj.bund.de/files/-/3516/Formulierungshilfe%20 
Gesetz%20zur%20Angemessenheit%20der%20Vorstandsverguetung.pdf. 
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In sum, what the United States lacks in its lenient approach to 
risk taking in the application of the business judgment rule the Unit-
ed States may make up for with its relatively strict disclosure regime 
and robust securities class action litigation regime.  Managers are 
permitted to incur many of the risks that they want to incur, and 
courts applying the business judgment rule in the United States give 
little or no consideration to the overall health of the company or 
even whether the risk is jeopardizing the company’s very existence.  If 
the risk is not sufficiently disclosed to investors, however, the direc-
tors are likely to be sued under the securities laws.  Directors thus 
may monitor for risk because they know they are responsible for dis-
closing it.  Turning back to the graph earlier in this Article, substan-
tive corporate law standards in the United States push the risk moni-
toring requirement toward leniency (toward the left on the graph), 
but the relatively robust securities disclosure rules, SEC enforcement 
procedures, and civil litigation regime shift the risk monitoring re-
quirement back toward stringency (to the right on the graph).
176
 
But the U.S. disclosure regime does not always work well, as il-
lustrated by what happened at Lehman Brothers and other compa-
nies.  This could be for a number of reasons: the risks incurred were 
too complex and investors did not understand what was being dis-
closed, investors ignored disclosures and instead relied on rating 
agencies when valuing debt securities, directors did not understand 
the risks enough to know whether they were being properly disclosed, 
disclosure rules were easy to circumvent as in the case of Lehman’s 
Repo 105, the SEC failed in its oversight responsibility, and/or be-
cause the SEC had no oversight responsibility over security-based 
swaps and similar financial instruments that Congress had earlier ex-
plicitly prohibited the SEC from regulating.
177
  The much-touted U.S. 
securities disclosure regime failed to prevent the 2008 financial crisis, 
yet the expansive U.S. version of the business judgment rule in cor-
porate law that allowed the risk taking to begin with has remained in-
tact. 
Against this backdrop, Germany and other countries that have 
used corporate law to control excessive risk taking may be skeptical of 
 
 176 See supra Part II. 
 177 Earlier prohibitions on SEC enforcement are codified in the Securities Act of 
1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b-1(b)(2) (2006), and the Securities Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78c-
1(b)(2) (2006), which state that security-based swap agreements are not securities for 
purposes of the securities laws and explicitly prohibiting the SEC from requiring reg-
istration of security-based swaps or even from taking proactive measures to prevent 
fraud in security-based swaps. 
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the traditional U.S. approach that allows almost any risk to be taken 
as long as it is disclosed. 
D. Other Recent developments 
The German approach to business risk continues to evolve.  
The ARAG case,
178
 in which the German High Court (Bundesgerich-
tshof) decided that the German business judgment rule
179
 will not 
cover informed business decisions by management if “conscious 
business risk has been inappropriately excessive,”
180
 had a significant 
impact on the debate in Germany.  Until recently, the debate was ra-
ther theoretical and dogmatic and the general public was not in-
volved.
181
  Now that scandals with risk taking by management have 
had an impact on the economy,
182
 the general public is more aware of 
 
 178 BGHZ 135, 244(Ger.); ZIP, 883 (Ger).  
 179 The German business judgment rule is now embodied in Aktiengesetz [AktGg] 
[German Stock Corporations Act], Sept. 6, 1965, BGBL. I at 1089, at § 93(I)(2) 
(Ger.). 
 180 BGHZ 135, 244, 253(Ger.); ZIP 883, 886 (Ger.). 
 181 See generally Christian Kirchner & Richard W. Painter, European Takeover Law—
Towards a European Modified Business Judgment Rule for Takeover Law, 1 EUR. BUS. ORG. 
L. REV. 353, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=247214 
(discussing a suggested alteration of the German business judgment rule).  
 182 For a general discussion of the problems of German banks in the context of 
the credit crisis, see Peter Gumbel, Subprime on the Rhine, FORTUNE, Sept. 3, 2007, at 
71; Carrick Mollenkamp, Edward Taylor & Ian McDonald, Global Scale: Impact of Mort-
gage Crisis Spreads—How Subprime Mess Ensnared German Bank—IKB Gets a Bailout, 
WALL ST. J., Aug. 10, 2007, at A1.  In the case of IKB Deutsche Industriebank, a bank-
er in this mid-sized bank invested one-third of available funds in foreign and mostly 
unknown shares.  Lutter, supra note 5, at 199.  IKB Deutsche Industriebank an-
nounced a total loss of $954 million from its exposure to the subprime crisis on July 
27, 2007 and the ECB joined the German Central Bank (Bundesbank) to form a con-
sortium of major German banks to raise $4.789 billion for a bailout of IKB.  Kara M. 
Westercamp, A Crack in the Façade and the Whole Building Came Tumbling Down: A Criti-
cal Examination of the Central Banks’ Response to the Subprime Mortgage Loan Crisis and 
Global Financial Market Turmoil, 18 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 197, 219 (2009).  
In the case of Sachsen LB, a Banker invested three times the value of the State budg-
et of the state of Saxony in foreign and mostly unknown shares.  Lutter, supra note 5, 
at 199.  Less than three weeks after IKB’s bailout, SachsenLB reported similar prob-
lems and forced a consortium of banks to provide a credit line of $17.3 billion to sta-
bilize Sachsen’s exposures.  Id.  For a summary of German cases in banking crisis, see 
Lutter, supra note 5, at 199; Dam, supra note 4, at 609–11 (elaborating on the effects 
of the subprime crisis on German banks including IKB).  
This German example illustrates the more general phenomenon that 
at least some European banks seized the opportunity to sell subprime 
securities backed by US mortgage loans and that European financial 
institutions used SIVs and conduits in much the same manner as Amer-
ican financial institutions.  Thus, it would be wrong to assume that reg-
ulatory reform is primarily about changes required in US law or that 
these changes would affect operations of only US banks. 
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the dangers of financial risk.
183
 
To address public concerns about management risk taking, 
the German legislature adopted the Act on the Appropriateness of 
Management Board Compensation (Gesetz zur Angemessenheit der 
Vorstandsvergütung, or VorstAG) on August 5, 2009.
184
  Recognizing 
that “managers who emphasize short-term parameters in manage-
ment lose sight of the long-term benefit of the corporation and are 
incentivized to take irresponsible risks,”
185
 the VorstAG requires a re-
duction of management board compensation if the corporation is in 
a crisis.
186
  The Act also introduces personal liability of management 
by way of a deductible for D&O insurance
187
 as well as personal liabili-
ty of members of the Supervisory Board for failure to appropriately 
determine management compensation.
188
 
The VorstAG’s attempt to limit risk taking by introducing per-
sonal liability for managers caused heightened media interest in 
these regulatory measures.
189
  To encourage long-term decision mak-
ing by management, the VorstAG requires that the performance-
based part of management compensation, such as options, are paya-
ble four years after the respective manager was granted such op-
tions.
190
  It also introduces a two-year hiatus between transitioning 
from management to supervisory board positions at the same com-
pany.
191
  Moreover, a tentative proposal to reform the German insol-
vency law, the Restructuring of Systemically Important Credit Institu-
tions Act (Gesetz zur Einführung einer Restrukturierungsverwaltung, 
 
Dam, supra note 4, at 610. 
 183 Koalition verschärft Haftung von Managern, DIE WELT, Apr. 24, 2009, available at 
http://www.welt.de/die-welt/article3613357/Koalition-verschaerft-Haftung-von-
Managern.html (Ger.). 
 184 VorstAG, supra note 175, at A–B. 
 185 Id. at A (Problem und Ziel).  
 186 Id. at Art. 1(b). 
 187 The VorstAG changed section 93(2)(3) of the German Corporation Act 
(AktG).  Pursuant to the new version of that section, a corporation that provides in-
surance coverage to the members of the Vorstand for risks resulting from their occu-
pational activities, a mandatory deductible that is personally born by the member of 
the Vostand must be included.  The value of the deductible ranges from a minimum 
of 10% of the damage up to the minimum amount of 1.5 times the annual base sala-
ry of the respective member of the Vorstand.  Id. at Art 1(2). 
 188 Id. at Art. 1(3).  
 189 See generally Koalition verschärft Haftung von Managern, supra note 183.  
 190 Id.  
 191 Id. The hiatus does not apply to members of management who were elected to 
the Aufsichtsrat by a vote of more than 25% of shareholders of the corporation. 
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or Restrukturierungsverwaltungsgesetz—RestrVG),
192
 would allow a 
newly created German authority to dismiss management of a finan-
cial institution if the institution is insolvent
193
 and if it is systemically 
important to restructure the institution.
194
  At the time of publication 
of this Article, it was unlikely that the German government would 
enact the RestrVG. 
The combination of the 2010 sovereign debt crisis and the 
2008 credit crisis has undermined confidence in the functioning of 
financial markets.  Regulations in Germany and in the EU will likely 
focus not only on financial institutions and their managers but also 
on financial markets.  One measure intended to ensure the integrity 
of financial markets in Germany and the EU was the prohibition of 
naked short sales by the German Finance Ministry in coordination 
with the German Securities and Markets Authority (Bundesanstalt für 
Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht—BaFin).
195
  The prohibition is, howev-
er, limited to trading in naked shorts of shares of a select group of 
banks, insurance companies, and financial market intermediaries.
196
  
The German Finance Ministry recently proposed a new Act to extend 
the time limit for the prohibition of naked short sales, thus making it 
permanent.
197
  The Ministry also proposed to extend the scope of the 
prohibition.
198
   
 
 192 Gesetz zur Einführung einer Restrukturierungsverwaltung 
[Restrukturierungsverwaltungsgesetz—RestrVG] [Restructuring of Systemically Im-
portant Credit Institutions Act], available at http://www.jura.uni-
duesseldorf.de/dozenten/noack/Restrukturierung.pdf (Ger). 
 193 Id. § 2(1)(a)–(c).  This is a similar approach to Chapter 11 of the U.S. Insol-
vency law. 
 194 Id. § 2(1)–(2).   The German approach is different from the U.S. approach in 
Chapter 11 of the U.S. Insolvency law in that it requires a systemic element or system-
ic relevance (in German, Systemrelevanz).  
 195 See Verbot für Leerverkäufe verlängert, BUNDESMINISTERIUM DER FINANZEN (Mar. 31, 
2009), available at http://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/DE/Wirtschaft__und 
__Verwaltung/Geld__und__Kredit/002__Bafin__Leerverkauf.html (Ger.).  Short 
selling is the practice of selling securities or assets that have previously been bor-
rowed from a third party with the intention of buying identical assets or securities at 
a later date to return to the lender.  A naked short, on the other hand, describes the 
practice of short-selling a security without first borrowing such security or ensuring 
that the security can be borrowed.   
 196 Id.  The entities included: “Aareal Bank AG, Allianz SE, AMB Generali Holding 
AG, Commerzbank AG, Deutsche Bank AG, Deutsche Börse AG, Deutsche Postbank 
AG, Hannover Rückversicherung AG, Hypo Real Estate Holding SG, MLP AG, 
Münchener Rückversicherungs-Gesellschaft AG.”  Id. 
 197 See Regierungsentwurf für ein Gesetz zur Vorbeugung gegen missbräuchliche Wertpapier- 
und Derivategeschäfte, BUNDESMINISTERIUM DER FINANZEN (Feb.6, 2010), available at 
http://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/nn_54/DE/Wirtschaft__und__Verwaltung
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In addressing these problems, however, Germany must con-
tend with the EU.  These German initiatives were instituted without 
consulting its European neighbors.
199
  In response to this action, the 
EU Commission proposed legislation that would curtail the ability of 
individual EU member states to unilaterally prohibit certain instru-
ments.
200
  Under this proposed legislation, before regulators in indi-
vidual EU member states can unilaterally put such measures in place, 
regulators must consult the European Securities and Markets Author-
ity (ESMA) and other EU member states.
201
  The proposed EU legisla-
tion would also give powers to EU member state authorities to restrict 
or ban credit-default swaps subject to coordination by ESMA.
202
 
 
/Finanz__und__Wirtschaftspolitik/Finanzpolitik/20100528-Leerverkaeufe.html?__ 
nnn=true (Ger.). 
 198 See id. 
 199 Reinhard Hönighaus, Kein Zockverbot mehr im Alleingang–BaFin soll Maßnahmen 
gegen Leerverkäufe besser abstimmen–EU Gesetz im Herbst, FIN. TIMES DEUTSCHLAND, June 
15, 2010, 16 (Ger.).  
 200 Id.  
 201 Id.  
 202  Press Release, Public Consultation on Short Selling and Credit Default Swaps, 
U.N. Press Release 10/255 (June 14, 2010), available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/10/255&format
=PDF&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en.  The intent of the new rules is de-
scribed as:  
The intention is that the measures envisaged on short selling should:  
- ensure Member States have the power to act to reduce system-
ic risks and risks to financial stability and market integrity aris-
ing from short selling and Credit Default Swaps,  
- facilitate co-ordination between Member States and the Euro-
pean Securities Markets Authority (ESMA) in emergency situ-
ations;  
- increase transparency on the short positions held by investors; 
and  
- reduce settlement risks linked with uncovered or naked short sell-
ing. . . .  
The options envisaged can be grouped into three types:  
- Powers for competent authorities to temporarily restrict or 
ban short selling and Credit Default Swaps in emergency situ-
ations (subject to coordination by ESMA);  
- Measures to increase transparency to regulators and the mar-
ket about short selling positions, including those obtained 
through the use of derivatives; and  
- Measures to reduce settlement risks of uncovered or naked 
short selling.  
The options under consideration also foresee powers for competent 
authorities to enforce the rules and the possibility of some limited ex-
emptions (for market makers and shares whose principal market is out-
side the EU). 
Id.  
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In a move likely to affect both financial institutions and finan-
cial markets, the German government also proposed publishing stress 
tests for banks in a unified and consolidated approach with other EU 
member states.
203
  Stress tests for banks are intended to assess how 
well banks are prepared to deal with extreme market scenarios.
204
  A 
stress test study was published last year in the United States, but bank-
ing institutions may have influenced it.
205
  While critics allege the pub-
lication of stress tests could lead to panic in EU capital markets, the 
Spanish Federal Reserve has already announced its intent to publish 
stress tests for banks.
206
  The former grand coalition government of 
Social Democrats and Christian Democrats in Germany had opposed 
the publication of such stress tests.
207
  European banking regulators 
now perform stress tests on a regular basis.
208
  The German banking 
industry opposed the publication of stress tests but most EU member 
states seem to favor such publication on the premise that “stress tests 
will show that Europe has an efficient mechanism to solve problems 
in the financial sector.”
209
  French President Nicolas Sarkozy and 
German Chancellor Angela Merkel agreed to disclose how banks per-
form on stress tests in order to ascertain that the financial system can 
withstand shocks.
210
 
Recently, in an effort to reduce risk taking, the EU Parliament 
approved new rules to curtail bankers’ bonuses and reinforce banks’ 
capital requirements.
211
  Under these new rules, bonuses would be 
 
 203 Christine Mai, Sorge um Geldhäuser - Berlin koordiniert europaweite Bloßstellung der 
Banken, FIN. TIMES DEUTSCHLAND, June 16, 2010, available at 
http://www.ftd.de/unternehmen/finanzdienstleister/:sorge-um-geldhaeuser-berlin-
koordiniert-europaweite-blossstellung-der-banken/50128924.html (Ger.).  
 204 Id.  
 205 David Enrich, New Doubts on EU Bank Stress Tests: Skeptics Wonder Why There’s so 
Much Optimism in Official Circles; Friday Is Day of Reckoning, WALL ST. J., July 20, 2010, at 
C2, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704720004 
575377202517842246.html (discussing effectiveness of stress tests of European 
banks).  
 206 Id.  
 207 Id.  
 208 Id.  
 209 Ina Lockhart, Meike Schreiber & Christine Mai, Bund kommt Banken bei 
Stresstests entgegen, FIN. TIMES DEUTSCHLAND, June 17, 2010, 
http://www.ftd.de/unternehmen/finanzdienstleister/:ftd-bankentag-bund-kommt-
banken-bei-stresstests-entgegen/50129578.html (Ger.).  
 210 See Tony Czuczka & Gregory Viscusi, EU Leaders Agree to Publish Results of Banks’ 
Performance on Stress Tests, BLOOMBERG (June 17, 2010, 1:32 PM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=akJ9nzKi3ZMo&pos=4.  
 211 Press Release, European Parliament, European Parliament ushers in new era 
for bankers’ bonuses (July 7, 2010), available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ 
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linked to salaries and the cash portion of bonuses would be capped at 
30% of the total amount or 20% for particularly high bonuses.
212
  
Bankers also risk losing the remainder of the bonus if the bank’s per-
formance erodes over three years following the bonus payment.
213
  
Under the new rules, banks that do not curtail the salaries of staff 
“whose professional activities have a material impact on the risk pro-
file of the bank or investment firm” will have to set aside more capital 
to make up for the risk.
214
  Notably, there has not been a similar de-
velopment in the United States. 
In an attempt to prevent a recurrence of the recent financial 
crisis, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision introduced new 
worldwide liquidity and leverage standards in its new Basel III Capital 
Accord.215  All of the twenty-seven member countries have already 
signed on to the new principles.216  The new principles will require 
banks to limit tier-one capital217 to 3% of un-weighted assets.218  The 
Committee also proposed that banks hold capital above the regulato-
 
news/expert/infopress_page/042-77908-186-07-28-907-20100706IPR77907-05-07-
2010-2010-false/default_en.htm.  
 212 Id.  
 213 Id. 
 214 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council, 
amending Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC as regards capital requirements 
for the trading book and for re-securitisations, and the supervisory review of remune-
ration policies, at 8 (2009), available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market 
/bank/docs/regcapital/com2009/Leg_Proposal_Adopted_1307.pdf.  
 215 BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING 
SUPERVISION, CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT: STRENGTHENING THE RESILIENCE OF THE 
BANKING SECTOR (2010), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs164.pdf [hereinafter BIS 
REPORT: STRENGTHENING THE BANKING SECTOR]. 
 216 Brooke Masters, Basel Breakthrough in Drive to Tighten Rules on Global Banking, 
FIN. TIMES, July 27, 2010, at 1. 
 217 BIS REPORT: STRENGTHENING THE BANKING SECTOR, supra note 215, at 12 (“The 
Committee therefore is announcing for consultation a series of measures to raise the 
quality, consistency, and transparency of the regulatory capital base. In particular, it 
is strengthening that component of the Tier 1 capital base which is fully available to 
absorb losses on a going concern basis, thus contributing to a reduction of systemic 
risk emanating from the banking sector.”). 
 218 BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING 
SUPERVISION, CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT: PROPOSED ENHANCEMENTS TO THE BASEL II 
FRAMEWORK (2009), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs150.pdf [hereinafter BIS REPORT: 
ENHANCEMENTS TO BASEL II].  See also Peter Miu, Bogie Ozdemire, & Michael Geisin-
ger, Can Basel III Work? Examining the New Capital Stability Rules by the Basel Committee: A 
Theoretical and Empirical Study of Capital Buffers, (Feb. 20, 2010), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1556446 (“. . . . the Basel Committee has proposed that a 
buffer range should be established above the minimum capital requirements such 
that, if Tier 1 capital should fall into the buffer range, [Financial Institutions] would 
be constrained in the total amount of discretionary earnings distributions.”). 
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ry minimum by introducing capital buffers219 that will rise and fall in a 
countercyclical manner.220  The minimum capital requirement is less 
onerous than feared by the banking industry.  Banks will not have to 
publish their capital ratios until 2015221 and will not have to comply 
with the 3% minimum until the end of 2017.222  To avoid a repeat of 
the Lehman Brothers collapse, however, regulators do want banks to 
retain enough liquid assets to survive a 30-day crisis.223 
In the United States, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act) addresses risk taking by 
banks and other large financial institutions by dramatically increasing 
the degree of government supervision.
224
  The law evolved from earli-
er proposals, including Senator Charles Schumer’s (D-NY) proposed 
Shareholder Bill of Rights Act of 2009, which set out corporate go-
vernance standards,
225
 required shareholder input in board elec-
tions,
226
 and, most importantly, required a shareholder vote on execu-
tive compensation disclosures.
227
  Schumer’s proposal also required 
that each public company board of directors establish a risk commit-
tee.
228
  Such a risk committee would be comprised of independent di-
rectors and would be “responsible for the establishment and evalua-
tion of risk-management practices.”
229
  Other legislative proposals 
included the “TARP Reform and Accountability Act of 2009.”
230
  Bar-
 
 219 Adrian Blundell-Wignall & Paul Atkinson, Thinking Beyond Basel III: Necessary 
Solutions for Capital and Liquidity, 2010 OECD J.: FIN. MARKET TRENDS ISSUE 1, 10 
(2010) http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/42/58/45314422.pdf. 
 220 Id. 
 221 Press Release, Bank for International Settlements, Basel Committee on Bank-
ing Supervision, Group of Governors and Heads of Supervision Announces Higher 
Global Minimum Capital Standards 7 (Sept. 12, 2010), 
http://www.bis.org/press/p100912.pdf. 
 222 Id. at 2 (“In July [2010], Governors and Heads of Supervision agreed to test a 
minimum Tier 1 leverage ratio of 3% during the parallel run period. Based on the 
results of the parallel run period, any final adjustments would be carried out in the 
first half of 2017 with a view to migrating to a Pillar 1 treatment on 1 January 2018 
based on appropriate review and calibration.”). 
 223 Nout Wellink, Chairman, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Remarks 
at the Institute of International Finance 2010 Spring Meeting, The Basel Committee and 
Regulatory Reform 6 (Jun. 11, 2010), http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp100611.pdf  
(“Banks must hold a stock of high-quality liquid assets that is sufficient to allow them 
to survive a 30-day period of acute stress.”). 
 224 Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 111 (2010). 
 225 Shareholder Bill of Rights Act of 2009, S. 1074, 111th Cong. § 5 (2009). 
 226 § 4. 
 227 § 3.  
 228 § 5(e). 
 229 § 5(e)(5)(A).  
 230 TARP Reform and Accountability Act of 2009, H.R. 384, 111th Cong. (2009).  
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ney Frank (D-MA), the Chairman of the House Financial Services 
Committee, introduced the act to harmonize and broaden executive 
compensation standards applicable to companies accepting govern-
ment financial assistance.
231
  Representative Gary Peters (D-MI) intro-
duced a more expansive version of the proposed law, the Sharehold-
er Empowerment Act of 2009, on June 12, 2009.
232
 
The Dodd-Frank Act that was eventually passed by Congress 
and signed by the President includes many of these provisions in 
thousands of pages of text.
233
  The Act is enormous and far-reaching, 
and we point out here only a few of its most notable provisions.  The 
Act creates a new “super regulator,” the Financial Stability Oversight 
Council, to oversee the financial industry and address future financial 
crises.
234
  The Council has the power to identify firms that threaten 
stability
235
 and subject them to stricter oversight by the Federal Re-
serve.
236
  The Federal Reserve and the Council can break up firms that 
have not responded to stricter oversight measures and continue to 
pose a threat.
237
 
The Act also creates a new “resolution,” or orderly liquida-
tion, authority in which the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(FDIC) is given broad discretion to intervene between a financial in-
stitution and its creditors.
238
  Critics of the Act say that this institutio-
nalizes the bailout process.
239
  Whereas European countries, including 
Germany, have been accustomed to a high degree of government in-
tervention in the banking sector, including government ownership of 
some banks, the Dodd-Frank Act represents an acknowledgment in 
the United States that some financial institutions are too big to fail 
and government oversight and wind-up authority cannot be limited 
 
 231 Deborah S. Prutzman, The Changing Roles of Directors as a Result of the Financial 
Crisis,  1766 P.L.I. Corp. 85, 97 (2009). 
 232 H.R. 2861, 111th Cong. (2009).  
 233 The rules promulgated under the Act will surely be thousands of more pages. 
 234 Dodd-Frank Act § 111 (2010). 
 235 § 112(a)(1).  
 236 § 113(a)(1).  
 237 § 165(d)(5)(B). 
 238 See § 172.  
 239 See John B. Taylor, The Dodd-Frank Financial Fiasco, WALL ST. J., July 1, 2010, at 
A19, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/NA_WSJ_PUB: 
SB10001424052748703426004575338732174405398.html (suggesting that the Act 
should have included reform of “Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the government 
sponsored enterprises that encouraged the origination of risky mortgages” and 
“reform of the bankruptcy code to allow large complex financial firms to go through 
a predictable, rules-based Chapter 11 process without financial disruption and with-
out bailouts”). 
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to commercial banks and other deposit-taking institutions.  The U.S. 
has rescued many large investment banks, insurance companies, in-
vestment funds, and other firms, and the Act seeks to make that 
process more predictable and orderly. 
The Act also creates a new federal entity, the Consumer Fi-
nancial Protection Bureau.
240
  The Bureau regulates consumer lend-
ing, which was the origination point for much of the financial risk 
taking that precipitated the 2008 crisis in the United States.
241
  Con-
sumer lending has been substantially less aggressive in Germany, 
making this aspect of financial reform less urgent there.
242
  As pointed 
out above, reckless borrowing by poorer EU member states was the 
origination point in Europe for bad loans, and reform measures 
there are likely to focus on that aspect of the problem rather than on 
consumers. 
The Dodd-Frank Act bestows on federal agencies broad regu-
latory authority over the trading of derivative securities and other fi-
nancial instruments that were also blamed for the financial crisis.
243
  
Regulation of the over-the-counter derivatives market means that in-
vestors will trade many of these instruments, including credit-default 
swaps, through an organized clearing system that is intended to pro-
vide more transparency and liquidity.  The Act requires bank-holding 
companies to spin off riskier derivatives trading into separate affili-
ates.
244
 Earlier drafts of the legislation had even more sharply cur-
tailed the ability of financial institutions to trade in derivative securi-
ties for their own account, but these provisions were scaled back after 
intensive lobbying by the banking industry.
245
 
Risky investment funds are another area of concern.  The Act 
restricts a banking entity from having an ownership interest in or be-
 
 240 Dodd-Frank Act § 1011 (2010). 
 241 § 1011(a).  The Act, however, exempts loans originated by auto dealer from 
the Bureau’s oversight.  §1029 
 242 German Growth, Confidence Create Virtuous Circle, GULF TIMES, Aug. 27, 2010, 
http://www.gulf-times.com/site/topics/article.asp?cu_no=2&item_no=382337 
&version=1&template_id=48&parent_id=28 (explaining private consumption driving 
domestic demand has traditionally lagged in Germany); Christel Kucharz, German 
Leaders Blame U.S. for Financial Crisis, WORLD VIEW (Sept. 25, 2008 7:58 AM), 
http://blogs.abcnews.com/worldview/2008/09/german-leaders.html (alluding to 
German banks losing money on loans originating in United States). 
 243 See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Act § 171(b)(7)(B)(i), § 610 (2010).  
 244 § 608.  
 245 Banks Lobby Against Ban on Derivatives Trading, DEALBOOK (May 10, 2010), 
http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/05/10/banks-lobby-against-derivatives-
trading-ban (discussing banking industry lobbyists convincing lawmakers to scale 
back bill aspects negative to the industry). 
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ing a sponsor of a private equity or hedge fund if such investments 
amount to more than 3% of the bank’s Tier 1 capital or the bank’s 
interest is more than 3% of the total ownership of the fund.
246
  Private 
equity and hedge funds with assets under management of $150 mil-
lion or more will have to register with the SEC,
247
 although venture 
capital funds will be exempt from full registration.
248
 
The Act also continues the federal government’s deep incur-
sion into corporate governance that began in earnest with the Sar-
banes-Oxley Act of 2002.
249
  Whereas Sarbanes-Oxley regulated the 
composition and responsibilities of audit committees,
250
 the Dodd-
Frank Act requires a broad range of financial services firms also to 
have a risk committee.
251
  The Act requires all publicly traded non-
bank financial companies supervised by the Board of Governors of 
the Federal Reserve System to have a risk committee.
252
  Also, all pub-
licly traded bank-holding companies with assets of more than $10 bil-
lion must have a risk committee.
253
  The risk committee is responsible 
for overseeing the firm’s risk management practices, and the commit-
tee must have at least one risk-management expert having experience 
with similar firms.
254
  The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
is empowered to decide how many independent directors must serve 
on the committee.
255
  The introduction of the risk committee will be a 
significant change because most boards now delegate risk oversight to 
 
 246 Dodd-Frank Act § 619(d)(4)(B)(ii) (2010).  
 247 § 408(m)(2). 
 248 § 407. 
 249 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745.  
 250 See, e.g., § 301. 
 251 See Dodd-Frank Act § 165(h) (2010).  
 252 Id. 
 253 § 165(h)(2)(A).  
 254 § 165(h)(3).  
 255 § 165(h)(3)(B).  As pointed out earlier in this Article, the emphasis in U.S. 
corporate law, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, and now the Dodd-Frank Act on independent 
directors is not shared in many other countries, including Germany.  Skeptics worry 
that perhaps because of their lack of ties to the company, independent directors do 
not have access to the information that they need to stop risks such as those that led 
to the 2008 financial crisis.  Bank Boards in the Aftermath of the Financial Crisis, MOODY’S 
INVESTORS SERVICE 6 (March 2010), available at http://www.directorship.com/media/ 
2010/03/Moodys-Bank-Boards-Mar-2010.pdf (discussing the importance of factors 
other than board independence in attaining board effectiveness, namely size of 
board); see generally David Yermack, Remuneration, Retention, and Reputation Incentives 
for Outside Directors, 59 J. FIN. 2281 (2004) (discussing how incentives structure relate 
to effectiveness of independent directors). 
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the audit committee.
256
  This new committee could increase the size 
of the board and perhaps result in hiring of new staff for the risk-
management committee.  This requirement also could result in more 
litigation if the composition of the risk committee or its alleged fail-
ure to do its job appropriately becomes a basis for additional share-
holder suits. 
The Dodd-Frank Act is notable not only for its sheer length 
and the enormous power it bestows on the federal government but 
also for what it does not do.  It does not break up the largest banks in 
the United States, which would have been one approach to the “too 
big to fail” problem.  It does little to help smaller and regional banks 
compete with the big banks.  Because complying with regulation is 
burdensome and expensive, the Act may have raised the barrier for 
entry into the financial services industry.  The Act does not restore 
the separation of commercial banking from investment banking that 
characterized the United States financial market before the repeal of 
the Glass-Steagal Act in 1999, which many observers, including for-
mer Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker, recommended be res-
tored.
257
  In some ways, Dodd-Frank may make the United States more 
similar to Germany and some other European countries that are 
dominated by a few gigantic banks which are allowed to do both 
commercial and investment banking but must also follow govern-
ment dictates about what they can and cannot do. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In Germany, the introduction of the business judgment rule 
in § 93(1)–(2) of the AktG could be indicative of a trend towards loo-
sening the substantive standard of care.  The imposition of an owner-
ship requirement of €100,000 (about $127,090) for shareholders to 
have standing to sue on behalf of the corporation in a derivative suit 
in § 148(1) of the AktG makes at least this aspect of procedural rules 
more favorable for defendant directors.  These developments are 
counterbalanced by the removal of some excessively risky decisions 
from the business judgment rule protection in the ARAG decision 
 
 256 Hot Topics: What Might Companies Do about the Risk Elephant in the Room?, 
DELOITTE 1 (October 2009), available at http://internalaudits.duke.edu/documents/ 
HotTopics_RiskElephant6_4_10.pdf (observing how less than 6% of one sample of 
companies has board-level standing risk committees). 
 257 See Dodd-Frank Alert: Regulators Take Center Stage, DLA PIPER (2010),  
http://www.dlapiper.com/files/upload/dodd-frank-act-intro.pdf; Matthew Benjamin 
& Christine Harper, Volcker Urges Dividing Investment, Commercial Banks (Update1), 
BLOOMBERG (Mar. 6, 2009 11:48 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/ 
news?pid=newsarchive&sid=atSsZ5Fp8xuY&dbk. 
KAAL PAINTER_FINAL_11.10.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/16/2010  12:33 PM 
2010] CONSTRAINTS ON RISK TAKING 1485 
and some post-2008 developments, including the introduction of the 
VorstAG, which requires personal liability of the Vorstand for taking 
unusual risks and of the Aufsichtsrat for failure to appropriately de-
termine management compensation.  The German legislature also 
seems inclined to prohibit market practices that it believes result in 
excessive risk taking and potentially destabilized markets. The pend-
ing prohibition of naked shorts and credit-default swaps in Germany 
and the EU illustrates this trend.   
In the United States, Delaware courts have not explicitly im-
posed a duty to monitor risk.  Because failure to disclose risk is a vi-
olation of federal securities laws, however, this may be a moot point.  
Unmonitored risk is likely to be undisclosed risk.  The Dodd-Frank 
Act now introduces a mandatory risk committee.  The Act also con-
tinues the trend in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act toward a federally man-
dated approach to corporate governance.  The federal government is 
prepared to tell financial services firms what they can and cannot do.  
The government also has new powers to sort out the mess the next 
time firms do not do what they are supposed to do or do it poorly. 
In both Germany and the United States, there are likely to be 
new substantive rules in response to what policy makers and the pub-
lic believe to be excessive risk taking that led to the financial crisis.  In 
the United States in particular, tightening of the substantive rules 
could also lead to more litigation.  More government interference in 
corporate governance is likely in both countries.  It is unclear if the 
resulting increase in monitoring costs will be offset by a decrease in 
the costs of bad business decisions that are avoided because of the 
new rules.  Depending on the cost of additional litigation and gov-
ernment interference, the trade-off between the cost and the benefit 
of imposing a duty to monitor risk on board members may or may 
not be “worthwhile” from the company’s perspective, or even that of 
society as a whole.  Indeed, the company’s perspective may not matter 
so much given the current political climate and concern about social 
externalities of business failure.  The severity of the substantive moni-
toring requirement and the procedures used to enforce it may in-
crease regardless of net costs to the company. 
 
